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ABSTRACT
The advent of the new religious institutionalism has brought the
relationship between religion and the state to the fore once again. Yet, for all
the talk of the appropriateness of religion–state interactions, scholars have yet
to examine how it functions. This Article analyzes the critical, yet usually
invisible, role of “religious interest groups”—lobby groups representing
religious institutions or individuals—in shaping federal legislation. In recent
years, religious interest groups have come to dominate political discourse.
Groups such as Priests for Life, Friends Committee on National Legislation,
Women’s Christian Temperance Union, and American Jewish Congress have
entered the political fray to lobby for legislative change that is reflective of
specific religious values. These religious interest groups collectively spend
over $350 million every year attempting to entrench religious values into the
law. These groups have become the primary mechanism for religious
involvement in federal politics, but, surprisingly, the place and role of these
groups has yet to be examined by legal scholars.
This Article shows that the key features of religious interest groups reflect
significant tensions within the emerging project of religious institutionalism. In
developing this claim, this Article identifies two benefits claimed to result from
religious involvement in politics—protecting religious liberty and enhancing
democratic participation—and demonstrates that in fact these benefits are
unlikely to result from religious interest group politicking. Instead, the pursuit
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of religiously bound interests as a legislative end results in the religious
interest being pursued as an end in and of itself, consequently imposing
significant costs on the values of religious liberty and democracy. Ultimately,
this Article claims that when considering the place of religion in the political
process, it is incumbent on scholars to consider both the institutional design
question of how religious participation in politics is operationalized, as well as
take into account both the costs and benefits of that involvement.
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INTRODUCTION
It has become par for the course among both politicians and commentators
that religion does, and should, have a place in the federal legislative process.
Legislators, executive officials, and other public figures publically proclaim
the need—and their desire—to “work with religious groups” to enact
legislation that responds to the needs of religious adherents in the community.1
Within the scholarly community, research on religious groups—that is, the
study of the place and benefits of religious groups in political life—
overwhelmingly advocates for inclusion of religious viewpoints.2 Indeed, the
idea that religious groups should have a role in the political process has
intuitive value. By including religious groups in politics and in the shaping of
1 See, e.g., Liliana Mihuţ, Two Faces of American Pluralism: Political and Religious, J. FOR STUDY
RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES, Winter 2012, at 39, 53 (“Then, in the 2000s, the Christian Coalition helped George
W. Bush to be elected; consequently, one of the first moves of the new President was to create an Office of
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives mainly to work with religious groups.”); Laurie Goodstein, Panel
Wants to End Ban on Church Political Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A13, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/08/15/us/panel-wants-to-end-ban-on-church-political-work.html
(discussing
Senator
Charles E. Grassley’s efforts in convening a commission comprised of fourteen evangelical Christian leaders,
recommending the removal of a 1954 ban disallowing churches and other houses of worship from endorsing
political candidates through revocation of their tax-exempt status); Top Bishops Fight Birth Control Deal,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 14, 2012, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/top-bishops-fight-birthcontrol-deal/ (claiming that New York Archbishop, Timothy Dolan, was holding President Barack Obama to
his “pledge to work with religious groups” regarding the Affordable Care Act contraception mandate and that
“he trusted Obama wasn’t anti-religious”); Peter Wallsten & N.C. Aizenman, Republicans Vow to Force
Repeal of Birth-Control Rule, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2012, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/boehner-vows-congressional-action-to-overturn-obama-administration-rule-on-birth-control/2012/02/
08/gIQAfFRczQ_story.html (claiming that President Barack Obama reiterated his “promise[] to work with
religious groups to address their concerns” in regards to the contraception mandate of the Affordable Care
Act).
2 See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2, 3 (1977); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC
SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 145 (2d ed. 1986) (claiming that there is a strong tradition
of religious argument from “Adams, Tocqueville, Lincoln, and a host of others who understood religiously
based values as the points of reference for public moral discourse”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 115; David Hollenbach,
Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 883 (1993);
Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from
Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 644–48 (providing a summary of religions historic
contributions to the political conversation in the United States); Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on
Religiously Grounded Morality Is Not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217,
233–34 (2001) (summarizing instances of religion’s constructive ethical contributions throughout U.S.
history).
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federal legislation on the front end,3 we might be reassured that the religious
liberty of Americans is being taken into consideration.4 Recent Supreme Court
decisions in both Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
EEOC5 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,6 reflect a judicial consensus
of the appropriateness and value of religious involvement in public life.7
Yet, within the legal community debates about religion–state interactions
rarely consider how this relationship functions. Despite increasing interest in
the role of religious institutions in politics and society more broadly,8 there is
scant study of the structure and operation of religious interest groups.9 This
3 See, e.g., Mihuţ, supra note 1, at 46 (noting how interest groups “have stimulated the representation of
various categories of people before the government and have facilitated political participation”); see also
David Yamane & Elizabeth A. Oldmixon, Religion in the Legislative Arena: Affiliation, Salience, Advocacy,
and Public Policymaking, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 433, 434 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect . . . that a
religiously informed worldview will act as a filter across policy domains.”).
4 See, e.g., Maureen O. Manion, Churches and States: The Politics of Accommodation, 44 J. CHURCH &
ST. 317, 317–18 (2002); Liliana Mihuţ, Lobbying–A Political Communication Tool for Churches and
Religious Organizations, J. FOR STUDY RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES, Summer 2011, at 64, 74 (detailing the role
of religious lobbying groups media campaigns and other advocacy tactics in the debate on abortion in Obama’s
healthcare reform); Monica Youn, Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church: A Case Study in Donor Disclosure,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2108, 2112 (2013). On the effect of religion on voting behavior and, consequently,
legislator action, see James T. Richardson & Sandie Wightman Fox, Religious Affiliation as a Predictor of
Voting Behavior in Abortion Reform Legislation, 11 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 347 (1972) (finding that
religious affiliation of state legislators is a stronger indicator of voting behavior on abortion than constituency,
party, or age).
5 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
6 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
7 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance:
Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 114, 118 (2012) (arguing that the decision will leave
“religion unregulated and out of control”); Marsha B. Freeman, What’s Religion Got to Do with It? Virtually
Nothing: Hosanna-Tabor and the Unbridled Power of the Ministerial Exemption, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 133, 142 (2013) (arguing that Hosanna-Tabor has given religious organizations protection above and
beyond that of other employers); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in
Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405, 429 (2013) (characterizing the decision as creating “a constitutional
right on steroids”); Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 181 (2014) (calling
the decision a “jurisprudential earthquake” whose “biggest aftershock has yet to be felt”).
8 See, e.g., Ted G. Jelen, Religious Priorities and Attitudes Toward Church and State, 42 REV.
RELIGIOUS RES. 87, 88 (2000) (attempting to address the question of how religious priorities relate to political
attitudes); Yamane & Oldmixon, supra note 3, at 434.
9 While there is a paucity of references to religious interest groups in the legal literature, there is a
growing and robust literature studying religious interest groups in political science and sociology. For
particularly robust discussion, see PAUL A. DJUPE & CHRISTOPHER P. GILBERT, THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF
CHURCHES (2009); LUKE EUGENE EBERSOLE, CHURCH LOBBYING IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL (1951); ALLEN D.
HERTZKE, REPRESENTING GOD IN WASHINGTON: THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LOBBIES IN THE AMERICAN
POLITY (1988); DANIEL J.B. HOFRENNING, IN WASHINGTON BUT NOT OF IT: THE PROPHETIC POLITICS OF
RELIGIOUS LOBBYISTS 21 (1995); STEVEN M. TIPTON, PUBLIC PULPITS: METHODISTS AND MAINLINE
CHURCHES IN THE MORAL ARGUMENT OF PUBLIC LIFE (2007); PAUL J. WEBER & W. LANDIS JONES, U.S.
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Article begins to fill this gap. It outlines how religious involvement in the
political process has been operationalized through the overlooked institutions
of “religious interest groups”—associations of either denominational houses of
worship or collectives of individuals organized to advance a distinct religious
viewpoint.10 This Article then examines the implications of religious interest
groups for the principal justifications of religious participation in the political
process: religious liberty and democratic participation.11 In undertaking an
accounting of both benefits and costs of religious involvement in politics via
religious interest groups, this Article complicates the general support for
religious participation in the political process. It turns out that advancement of
the religious voice through religious lobbyists imposes both benefits and costs
on religious liberty and democracy.12
In advancing this claim, this Article is exploring a subject that is largely
unrecognized by legal scholars, who have failed to consider the place and role
of religious interest groups in the legislative process.13 This lacuna in the
literature is surprising given the longstanding and entrenched role of religious
interest groups in the federal legislative process. Indeed, it is impossible to
accurately describe the religion–state relationship without an appreciation for
religious lobbyists. These groups, ranging from well-known church lobbies
like the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops to less-known coalitions
and specialist single-issue groups like the Christian Coalition,14 are now
RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS: INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES (1994) (providing a comprehensive survey of all
religious interest groups in the United States); Daniel J.B. Hofrenning, Into the Public Square: Explaining the
Origins of Religious Interest Groups, 32 SOC. SCI. J. 35 (1995); Paul J. Weber & T.L. Stanley, The Power and
Performance of Religious Interest Groups, Q. REV., Summer 1984, at 28.
10 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 21; see also PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL: RELIGIOUS ADVOCACY GROUPS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 16 (2012),
available at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/11/ReligiousAdvocacy_web.pdf [hereinafter LOBBYING FOR
THE FAITHFUL]; WEBER & JONES, supra note 9, at vii; Weber & Stanley, supra note 9, at 28 (“By religious
interest groups we mean groups which are active in national politics and which identify themselves as
religious, have a largely religious membership, and/or are active in areas traditionally considered to be of
significance to religious groups . . . .”).
11 See infra Part II.B (identifying religious liberty and democratic participation as the core justifications
for religious argument in politics).
12 See infra Part III.B–C (outlining how religious interest groups impose costs on religious liberty and
democratic participation).
13 But see Manion, supra note 4 (discussing the politics of religious accommodations); Zoë Robinson,
Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion,
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133 (2011) (discussing the political nature of religious accommodations); Youn,
supra note 4 (alluding to the organized lobbying of the Church of the Latter-Day Saints in opposing
Proposition 8).
14 See LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10; Mihuţ, supra note 4, at 74; Fred Van Geest,
Christian Denominational and Special Interest Political Action on Public Policy Issues Related to Sexual
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pivotal players in policy developments and lawmaking.15 In highlighting
religious interest groups’ activities and features, this Article attempts to draw
religious interest groups out from the shadows of the legislative process and
reveal that the specialized nature of religious-interest-group lobbying has
effects on the goals of religious liberty and democracy that merit scholarly
attention.
Specifically, this Article claims that the facilitation of religious
involvement in politics through the medium of religious interest groups
imposes serious costs on the principal goals of religious participation in the
political process: religious liberty and democratic participation. It is regularly
claimed that religious participation in the legislative process is essential to
achievement of these two goals.16 Indeed, a prevailing theme of contemporary
law and religion scholarship cites the need for protection of religious liberty
from undue burdens as a key driver for religious voices in politics.17 These
same proponents of religious voice in politics also claim that religious
involvement in the political process will ensure the broad participation in the
democratic process, and that participation in the political process will ensure
that substantive democratic outcomes will reflect inputs of the all members of
the political community.18 Yet, by failing to consider how religious
participation in the political process is operationalized—through religious
interest groups—commentators have failed to recognize the tensions among
these goals.19 It turns out that pursuance of religious interests via religious

Orientation, 69 SOC. RELIGION 335 (2008). For a comprehensive database of the active religious interest
groups in the United States, see Religious Advocacy Sortable Directory, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE
PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-advocacy-directory/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). For historic
accounts of American religious interest groups, see generally EBERSOLE, supra note 9 (describing religious
interest groups in America in 1951); WEBER & JONES, supra note 9 (detailing the active religious interest
groups as of 1991).
15 Gregg Ivers, Religious Organizations as Constitutional Litigants, 25 POLITY 243, 244 (1992); see also
Hofrenning, Public Square, supra note 9, at 35; Mihuţ, supra note 4, at 71; Van Geest, supra note 14, at 336;
Yamane & Oldmixon, supra note 3, at 434.
16 See infra Part II.B (describing the principal goals of religious democratic participation and religious
liberty).
17 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS (2002); Louis
Fisher, Statutory Exemptions for Religious Freedom, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 291 (2002); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Reversal of Roles, 2001 BYU L. REV. 611 (2001).
18 See, e.g., HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 199–200; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 71; Mihuţ, supra note 1,
at 46 (claiming that interest groups “have stimulated the representation of various categories of people before
the government and have facilitated political participation”).
19 See, e.g., Mihuţ, supra note 4, at 71 (“[T]he activities developed by churches and religious
organizations in order to influence public policy are sometimes characterized as a violation of the church –
state separation . . . .”).
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interest groups complicates, and ultimately disserves, the goals of religious
liberty and democratic participation.
In exploring this complicated question, this Article proceeds in four parts.20
Part I provides a primer on religious interest groups, taking time to describe the
history of religious interest groups in America. It then identifies the salient
markers of religious interest groups that define them as unique among interest
groups—and both uniquely beneficial and uniquely dangerous for religious
liberty and the democratic process. Ultimately, Part I aims to draw religious
interest groups out of the shadows of the legislative process and into the public
forum where the validity of their continued presence in politics can be
examined.
Part II examines the benefits said to result from religious interest group
politicking.21 It first sets out the traditional goals stated for justifying the
continued presence of religion in the legislative process—protection of
religious liberty and enhancement of democratic participation—before
considering the unique prowess of religious interest groups in attaining those
goals. Part III considers the flip side to the benefits posed in Part II and
articulates the unique and present dangers of religious interest groups in the
legislative process.22 After outlining the traditional concerns for including
religion in the legislative process, Part III demonstrates how religious interest
groups amplify and enlarge these traditional concerns. It then describes how
the success of religious interest groups comes at a cost to both democracy and
religious liberty, undermining the values enshrined in the First Amendment.
Part IV concludes by sketching some possible directions for controlling the
impact of religious interest groups on religious liberty and democracy, while
recognizing the tradeoffs that will inevitably have to be made.23 It considers
20 The structure and framework for this article is drawn from Miriam Seifter’s excellent article, States as
Interest Groups in the Legislative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953 (2014). In her article, Professor Seifter
examines the idea that states act as interest groups in the administrative process, lobbying federal regulatory
agencies for outcomes that benefit the states. Professor Seifter examines the features of state interest groups, as
well as the legal framework for state involvement in the administrative process. Professor Seifter posits that
there are both benefits (protecting state power) and costs (impact on agency decision making, and the
democratic accountability of agencies) to states lobbying in the administrative process. Professor Seifter’s
approach is groundbreaking, and I decided to build on her framework and present my study of religious
interest groups through the same lens. While the structure of the two articles is parallel, this article focuses on
the discrete issue of lobbying by religious interest groups—not lobbying by the states.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part IV.
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the impact that regulating religious interest groups might have on religious
speech, as well as religious liberty, and outlines possible reforms that endeavor
to balance the countervailing interests involved.
***
Before moving to the substance of this Article, it is necessary to make a
point about methodology: because this Article begins the project of
highlighting the presence and role of religious interest groups in the legislative
process, it does not attempt to sort out how the attributes of religious interests
groups described in this Article are attributable to interest groups more
generally, or at the very least to ideological—although secular—interest
groups specifically (e.g., environmental interest groups). It could be that when
we compare religious interest groups to secular ideological groups, there is a
low level of variance in the gains achieved from the lobbying efforts. While
assessing this empirical question is beyond the scope of this Article, it
maintains that because of the particular constitutional commitment to religious
liberty in the First Amendment,24 even if there is low—or no—variance
between the success of secular ideological lobbyists and religious lobbyists,
any gains made by religious interest groups at the expense of general religious
liberty, democracy, or both, present specific constitutional concerns that
commentators must begin to grapple with.25
I. THE RISE AND ROLE OF RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS IN THE FEDERAL
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
This Part presents a descriptive account of religious interest groups in the
United States, providing the necessary foundation for the subsequent analysis
of the involvement of religious groups in federal politics in Parts II and III. To
this end, section A begins the project of defining religious interest groups by
describing the historic advocacy efforts of those groups traditionally identified
as religious lobbyists. This sets the scene for section B’s examination of the
distinctive traits and lobbying practices of religious interest groups. In doing
so, section B identifies the salient features of religious interest groups that are

24

The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are contained within the First Amendment, which reads
in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25 For an excellent article grappling with the Speech Clause implications of restricting religious speech,
see Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not “Free Speech”?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379 (arguing that
limits on religious speech are consistent with current Speech Clause doctrine).
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instrumental to enhancing the values of religious liberty and democracy, yet
coincide to undermine these goals.
A. A History of Religious Interest Groups in America
Religious advocacy has, to some degree, always been part of American
interest group pluralism. Indeed, at the founding of the Constitution itself,
many religious groups worked to ensure that a close relationship between
church and state remained, despite the newly minted First Amendment.26
Religious groups were consistently part of national lobbying campaigns—for
example, rallying against Sunday mail delivery or Sunday business hours.27
The most prominent early example of religious involvement in issues of
politics and social policy was the abolition movement. Religious groups
frequently voiced their opposition to slavery in the public square despite
government and citizenry rebuke over what was seen as an inappropriate
attempt by religious groups to influence legislation.28 The Quakers were early
opponents of slavery, with George Keith telling fellow Quakers in 1693 “[n]ot
to buy any Negroes, unless it were on purpose to set them free.”29
The Quakers were not the only opponents of slavery. The Methodist
Conference of 1800, for example, directed the “Annual Conference to ‘draw up
addresses for the gradual emancipation of the slaves, to the legislatures of
26 There is robust literature on the history of religious lobbyists in the United States. See, e.g., EBERSOLE,
supra note 9 (examining the activities of church associations in Washington, D.C.); GAINES M. FOSTER,
MORAL RECONSTRUCTION: CHRISTIAN LOBBYISTS AND THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF MORALITY, 1865–1920
(2002) (discussing the role of religious groups in the fight against slavery); JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE
NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2004) (discussing the development of formal religious
lobby groups in Washington, D.C.); Peter J. Thuesen, The Logic of Mainline Churchliness: Historical
Background Since the Reformation, in THE QUIET HAND OF GOD: FAITH-BASED ACTIVISM AND THE PUBLIC
ROLE OF MAINLINE PROTESTANTISM (Robert Wuthnow & John H. Evans eds., 2002); see also LOBBYING FOR
THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 23–27 (providing a brief overview of the history of religious lobbying in
America).
27 See Marye Lorelle Thomas, Faith-Based Organizations and Legislative Advocacy: A Qualitative
Inquiry 26–34 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University) (on file with
the
Digital
Archive,
Virginia
Commonwealth
University),
available
at
https://digarchive.library.vcu.edu/bitstream/handle/10156/1989/thomasml_phd.pdf?sequence=1. Importantly,
not all religious groups were involved in national politics. Once the First Amendment was ratified, many
religious groups withdrew from public life completely, believing that the primary role of the church was to
“encourage faithful relationships between individuals and God” and that the church had no role in politics. See
HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 35.
28 EBERSOLE, supra note 9, at 3–5; Thuesen, supra note 26, at 36.
29 EBERSOLE, supra note 9, at 2 (quoting GEORGE KEITH, AN EXHORTATION AND CAUTION TO FRIENDS
CONCERNING BUYING OR KEEPING OF NEGROES 2 (New York, William Bradford 1693)).

ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2

1050

12/17/2015 8:41 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1041

those states in which no general laws have been passed for that purpose. . . .
LET THIS BE CONTINUED FROM YEAR TO YEAR UNTIL THE
DESIRED END BE ACCOMPLISHED.’”30 Driven by their belief that the
institution of slavery was inherently immoral, as based on their religious faith,
groups such as the Quakers believed that living a moral life compelled their
involvement on the national political stage. There was, of course, disagreement
among religious groups on the issue of slavery, despite the visible and vocal
presence of the Quakers and other like-minded groups. The impending Civil
War and the issue of slavery drove many denominational schisms among
various Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians. Those subgroups within each
denomination that supported the institution of slavery responded to the
opponents of slavery with their own interpretations of sacred texts and claims
as to what morality required with respect to slavery.31
Despite the prominence of religious groups in the national debate over
slavery, religious lobbying in the United States did not become a permanent
fixture on the national scene until the late nineteenth century, following the
post-Civil War expansion of the federal government.32 This period represents
somewhat of a “moral reconstruction” where religious groups organized
specific subgroups to advocate against the evils of alcohol, Sabbath breaking,
impurity, and gambling.33 Many religious groups made a deliberate choice to
enter the national political forum and focused their efforts on attempting to
influence legislation such that it restricted, and therefore controlled, citizens’
desire to “sin” and their economic means to do so.34
The most visible example of the lobbying efforts of religious groups in this
period is the temperance movement.35 The temperance movement represented
30 Id. at 3 (alterations in original) (quoting H. MATTISON, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF 1860, at 29 (New
York, Mason Bros. 1858)).
31 See id.
32 See LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 23.
33 See FOSTER, supra note 26, at 112; see also MORONE, supra note 26 (discussing the development of
the religious lobby); Gaines M. Foster, Conservative Social Christianity, the Law, and Personal Morality:
Wilbur F. Crafts in Washington, 71 CHURCH HIST. 799, 806 (2002) (discussing the religious lobby efforts
against “the ‘Big Four’ evils, intemperance, impurity, Sabbath breaking, and gambling” (quoting WILBUR F.
CRAFTS, PATRIOTIC STUDIES OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF MORAL LEGISLATION 62 (1910)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
34 See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 26, at 112.
35 See John L. Merrill, The Bible and the American Temperance Movement: Text, Context, and Pretext,
81 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 145 (1988); Ian R. Tyrrell, Drink and Temperance in the Antebellum South: An
Overview and Interpretation, 48 J. S. HIST. 485, 486 (1982); see also Mihuţ, supra note 4, at 72 (“The history
of religious lobbying started . . . thanks to the activities developed by the Methodist Church to promote ‘the
cause of temperance’ and to support the Prohibition as a way to combat alcohol-related problems.”).
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an individual morality issue around which religious leaders and citizens could
coalesce, prompting the formation of significant religious interest groups,
separate from (although maintaining significant formal and financial ties with)
the churches themselves on the national scene.36 Many groups, including the
Anti-Saloon League and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, were
founded specifically to lobby for a total ban of alcohol in the United States.37
The fulltime officers of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union
successfully employed legislator knowledge of the large and growing
grassroots membership in the group as leverage to have their concerns and
moral reforms brought before Congress and individual legislators.38 Other
examples of the period include lobbying efforts against the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints and the practice of polygamy.39
The religious lobby slowly grew in the early twentieth century, with the
Christian Science Church and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church being among
the first religious denominations to establish a permanent advocacy office in
Washington, D.C. in 1900 and 1901 respectively.40 Many of the larger
denominations followed suit, and by the second decade of the twentieth
century, religious denominations with advocacy offices in Washington
included the Methodist Episcopal Church (which became the United Methodist
Church in 1968), and the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America
(founded in 1908 and eventually becoming part of the National Council of the
Churches of Christ in the USA).41 In addition to Protestant groups, Catholic
organizations also set up shop in Washington. Groups such as Catholic
Charities USA, the National Catholic Educational Association, and various

36

See EBERSOLE, supra note 9, at 9.
Id.; see also LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 23. For example, the Charter of the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union specified as follows:
37

That whereas, the object of just government is to conserve the best interests of the governed: and
whereas the liquor traffic is not only a crime against God, but subversive of every interest of
society; therefore, in behalf of humanity, we call for such legislation as shall secure this end; and
while we will continue to employ all moral agencies as indispensable, we hold prohibition to be
essential to the full triumph of this reform.
PETER H. ODEGARD, PRESSURE POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE 38 (1928); see also
FOSTER, supra note 26, at 36 (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION 651 (New York,
Funk & Wagnalls 1891)).
38 See ODEGARD, supra note 37, at 153.
39 See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 38–39 (2002).
40 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 23.
41 Id. at 23–24.
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groups representing America’s Catholic bishops established permanent offices
in the nation’s capital.42
World War II led to an increase in religious lobbying.43 The advent of the
Selective Service Bill of 1940 brought about activism for conscientious
objection from churches. For example, members of the pacifist Quaker Church
formed the Friends Committee on National Legislation in 1943 to advocate for
the protection of conscientious-objector status.44 Around this time, other
Protestant denominations such as the Baptists, Congregationalists, Lutherans,
and Presbyterians entered the national lobbying scene.45 While growth in the
religious lobbying market slowed between 1950 and 1970, a number of Jewish
advocacy groups formed in the wake of the Holocaust and the creation of the
State of Israel.46 The Civil Rights movement of the 1960s also led to a wave of
religious advocacy groups such as the Progressive National Baptist
Convention, an African-American Baptist group.47
After 1970, the religious lobby scene in Washington changed markedly.48
Washington experienced a surge in religious groups entering into the overtly
political lobbying scene. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life notes
that the number of religious advocacy groups rose at an accelerating pace with
each successive decade.49 The explosion of organizations included a number of
single-issue advocacy groups (e.g., abortion), as well as more groups
representing religious schools and colleges, specific denominations, and
various religious traditions.50 The political science literature is replete with
theories as to why there was such a large explosion of religious interest groups
entering the lobbying scene in the 1970s. Explanations include a general rise in
public religious expression,51 a trend toward the institutionalism of political

42

Id. at 25.
See LEE E. DIRKS, RELIGION IN ACTION: HOW AMERICA’S FAITHS ARE MEETING NEW CHALLENGES
142–49 (1965); HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 29–32.
44 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 25.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., id. at 26.
47 See, e.g., DIRKS, supra note 43, at 142–49.
48 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 32–36; LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26–27; WEBER &
JONES, supra note 9, at xxvii.
49 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26–27.
50 Id.; see also DAVID S. GUTTERMAN, PROPHETIC POLITICS: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–5 (2005); HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 36–37.
51 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26; see also HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 32.
43
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activism in America more generally,52 the continued growth of the federal
government in everyday life,53 as well as the backlash against the Warren
Court’s expansive interpretation of various individual rights, including a right
to an abortion,54 and the ever increasing restriction of the involvement of
religion in government institutions, such as schools.55
To quantify the increase in religious interest groups in federal politics, in
the 1930s there were 10 religious advocacy groups with registered offices in
Washington.56 By 1970 that number increased to 38, and by 2010 there were
215 registered religious advocacy groups in Washington.57 In 2010, these
groups collectively employed over 1,000 people in the Washington area and
spent at least $350 million on religious advocacy—with the median annual
expenditure amounting to almost $1 million.58 More than one-third of the
groups reported annual expenditures of between $1 million and $5 million per
year, and around one-in-ten groups spent over $5 million per year.59 The
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops spent over $26 million in 2009,
the Family Research Council, a conservative Christian interest group, spent
over $14 million, and the National Right to Life Committee spent over
$11 million.60 According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, these
religious interest groups spend their money on informing constituents, meeting
with officials, initiating letter or email campaigns, corresponding with
policymakers, issuing news releases, informing the public, signing coalition
letters, and writing policy papers.61 Religious interest groups, then, are an
important and entrenched feature of our political system, and it is critical that
we begin to study and understand their effect on religious liberty and the
democratic process.
52 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26; see also RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990).
53 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26 (noting “the growing reach of the federal
government in economic, environmental and social policy”).
54 See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 243–44
(2001).
55 See, e.g., ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE, AND
STRATEGIC CHOICES 258–59 (4th ed. 2010).
56 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 24.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 13–14, 55.
59 Id. at 14.
60 Id. at 15; PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., LOBBYING FOR THE
FAITHFUL: ALL EXPENDITURES DATA 8, 15, 18 (2012), available at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/11/
all-expenditures.pdf.
61 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 18.
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B. The Salient Features of Religious Interest Groups
This section elucidates four salient features of religious interest groups that
are critical to the arguments advanced in Parts II and III—that religious interest
groups thrive as advocates of the values of religious liberty and democracy, yet
in the end potentially impede both democracy and religious freedom.62 The
four features are as follows: (1) the nature and mission of a religious interest
group; (2) the unique identity and the variable selection of individual and
group actors that religious interest groups represent; (3) the distinctive nature
of the groups’ lobbying; and (4) the relative opacity of religious interest groups
to both the public generally, and a subset of their members specifically.63
1. Identifying Religious Interest Groups and Their Mission
First, it is critical to map the contours of what exactly a religious interest
group looks like, as well as the institutional mission that delineates the
religious interest group from other religious and religiously based
organizations.
Importantly, by “religious interest group,” this Article refers to a
membership organization that represents some interest that is based on religion
and attempts to influence politics.64 Of course, many religious groups
participate in politics directly.65 However, the group being considered in this
Article is not itself a church or denominational organization, for example, the
Catholic Church or the Society of Friends. Instead, a religious interest group is
a political lobbying group with a formal lobbying presence in Washington,
specifically established to lobby for a religiously based policy interest in the
legislative process.66

62

This is a point made by Miriam Seifter in the context of states as interest groups. See Seifter, supra
note 20, at 957 (arguing that it is critical to examine the costs as well as the benefits of states as interest groups
in the administrative process).
63 On similar salient factors that identify states acting as interest groups that are critical to any assessment
of the normative voracity of states as interest groups, see Seifter, supra note 20.
64 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 21; see also WEBER & JONES, supra note 9 (providing a comprehensive
survey of all religious interest groups in the United States); Weber & Stanley, supra note 9, at 28–29.
65 See, e.g., Clark E. Cochrane, Jerry D. Perkins & Murray Clark Havens, Public Policy & the
Emergence of Religious Politics, 19 POLITY 595 (1987) (examining religious politics in the 1970s and 1980s).
66 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 44; LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 16; Robert Zwier, The
Power and Potential of Religious Interest Groups, 33 J. CHURCH & ST. 271, 271 (1991). Note that some
groups prefer to use the term “advocacy” rather than “lobbying” largely because the term “religious lobbying”
might raise the specter of the Internal Revenue Service. On the IRS charitable exemption rules, see Brian
Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561 (2013) [hereinafter Galle, Charities
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Religious interest groups present in two forms, with the distinction being
the principal whose interest the group represents in the political sphere.67 In its
first form, the religious interest group is a representative of a specific religious
denomination or church.68 These groups are interest groups that are
empowered to represent particular religious traditions, specific congregations,
or both. Powerful examples of this form of interest group include Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ Office of Public and International Affairs,
“whose influence and actions are relevant to the mission of The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,”69 the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious
Liberty, which is comprised of “15 national, state and regional Baptist bodies
in the United States and supported by thousands of churches and individuals
across the country,”70 and the Mennonite Central Committee, established by
Mennonite denominational bodies to represent their interests in Washington.71
In its second form, the religious interest group does not exist as a
representative of a church or religious group.72 Instead, in this second form, the
religious interest group represents a collective of individuals whose views are
expressly derived from—and depend on—a religious perspective. In this form,
the religious interest group is an intermediary between either an institutional
religious group and the state, or a collection of individuals whose policy goals
are based on religious principles. Examples of this form of interest group
include Catholics Against Capital Punishment, established by American
Catholics to pursue the abolition of the death penalty in accordance with
Catholic teachings,73 and Concerned Women for America, a group founded by
Beverly LaHaye to represent the interests of Christian women in the legislative

in Politics]; Brian Galle, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of Charities, 103 NW. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 370 (2009) [hereinafter Galle, The LDS Church].
67 Interest groups in American politics are often described as political intermediaries between a principal
(the voters) and the agent (the legislators). See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through
Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999).
68 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 16.
69 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Mission Statement, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE
PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-advocacy/church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints-office-ofpublic-and-international-affairs/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
70 About Us, BAPTIST JOINT COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://bjconline.org/mission-history/
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
71 Quick Facts About MCC U.S., MENNONITE CENT. COMMITTEE, http://mcc.org/press-center/facts (last
visited Mar. 5, 2015).
72 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 44; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 21–22; LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL,
supra note 10, at 16; Zwier, supra note 66, at 271–72.
73 Mission, CATH. MOBILIZING NETWORK, http://catholicsmobilizing.org/mission/ (last visited Mar. 5,
2015).
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process.74 The definition also includes groups that are organized to influence
public policy based on an expressly nonreligious perspective.75 Critical
examples of these groups include the American Humanist Association, which
states that it takes “philosophical issue with beliefs of religious followers,” and
that they are organized to ensure that a “wall of separation” remains between
church and state,76 as well as the Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, organized to preserve the “constitutional principle of church-state
separation as the only way to ensure religious freedom for all Americans.”77
In either form, religious interest groups include those groups that do not
explicitly refer to themselves as “religious,” instead calling their advocacy
agenda “faith based.” The term “faith based” evolved as a consequence of the
uneasiness over the presence of explicitly identified religious groups in
politics.78 The shift from “religious” to “faith based” substituted a term that
described an organized set of beliefs (religion) to a term that connoted reliance
on “trust in truth,” thereby getting around the traditional objection of any overt
relationship between religion and the state.79 The shift by some groups from
identifying as religious interest groups to faith-based groups represents both a
discomfort with the idea of overt lobbying as a principled issue, as well as the
practical concern of church groups to remain in compliance with IRS rules
limiting the lobbying activities of not-for-profit organizations.80

74

Our History, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AM., http://www.cwfa.org/about/our-history/ (last visited Mar.
5, 2015).
75 This is the approach of leading political scientists studying religious interest groups. See, e.g.,
HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 22; Robert Zwier, The World and Worldview of Religious Lobbyists (Apr. 4–6,
1988) (unpublished manuscript presented at the meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago) (on file with the Emory Law Journal).
76 Frequently Asked Questions, AM. HUMANIST ASS’N, http://americanhumanist.org/AHA/Frequently_
Asked_Questions (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
77 Our Mission, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION CHURCH & ST., https://www.au.org/about/our-mission
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
78 See sources cited supra note 66 (noting that religious lobbying is considered by some to be suspect,
and some groups prefer the nomenclature “faith based advocates”); see also William Safire, The Way We Live
Now—6-27-99: On Language; Faith-Based, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 16 (speculating on
the nomenclature evolution from the use of “religious” to “faith-based”); Steven Rathgeb Smith & Michael R.
Sosin, The Varieties of Faith-Related Agencies, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 651 (2001) (discussing faith-based
groups).
79 Safire, supra note 78, at 16; Thomas, supra note 27, at 4–7.
80 Churches and the like are typically registered as tax–exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue
Service Code and are thus limited in the amount of lobbying activity that they can undertake.
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also infra notes 296–305 and accompanying text (discussing the limits
imposed by the Internal Revenue Service on the lobbying activities of exempt groups). In addition, there are
potential Establishment Clause issues raised by direct religious group engagement with the state in the manner
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Collectively, what religious interest groups share is a common institutional
mission. Religious interest groups’ advocacy efforts were initiated to create a
mechanism for religious groups and individuals to express their religiously
based views on public policy—a voice for religion qua religion.81 Today,
religious interest groups continue their focus on facilitating the dissemination
of a religious perspective in the legislative process. According to the Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life, to be classified as a national religious
interest group, a group would need to either advocate on behalf of a particular
denomination or tradition, advocate on behalf of a constituency defined in
religious terms, advocate on behalf of a religious institution or group of
institutions, promote religious values in public policy, promote an expressly
secular or nonreligious perspective on public policy, or encourage
policymakers to integrate faith into their work.82
For religious interest groups, advocating for public policy from a religious
perspective encompasses many activities. Many of the advocacy efforts
include lobbying attempts to influence legislators or the public,83 but it can also
include broader activities aimed at Congress and the Executive branch and its
related administrative agencies. For example, in 2008, the Family Research
Council spent over $14 million on advocacy efforts,84 including “mobilizing
the grassroots,” “fighting for family tax relief” in Congress, and “combating
judicial activism that leads to court rulings that hurt families.”85 Another
example is the American Jewish Committee, which spent over $13 million on
advocacy efforts,86 including “lobby days, private meetings with members of
congress, community mobilization on issues of concern, and meeting with

described in this Article. On this point, see infra Part IV.B (outlining the relevant Establishment Clause
doctrine).
81 See LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 16.
82 See id. at 63; see also HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 22; WEBER & JONES, supra note 9, at 8–12
(including groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Ethical Union, which are
nominally non-religious but advocate on issues that are of concern to religion).
83 See Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Lobbying Issues, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 1997, at 261 (1996),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicp97.pdf; see also Galle, Charities in Politics, supra note
66.
84 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 15.
85 FAQs, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/faqs (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (follow hyperlink
associated with the question “What is FRC Action?”).
86 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 15.
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high-ranking officials of local governments.”87 Combined, religious interest
groups spent in excess of $350 million on similar advocacy efforts in 2008.88
Many religious interest groups publicize mission statements, official
positions, or long-standing conventions that explicitly specify the groups’ goal
of advancing the needs and concerns of particular denominations and
individuals, based on the religious principles of the group, groups, or
individuals that the interest group represents. The Family Research Council,
for example, “champions marriage and the family as the foundation of
civilization, the seedbed of virtue,” and aims to “shape public debate” where
“God is the author of life, liberty, and the family.”89 CitizenLink “inspires men
and women to live out biblical citizenship that transforms culture,” focusing on
“issues involving the sanctity of human life, the preservation of religious
liberties and the well-being of the family as the building block of society,”
“from a foundation firmly established in a biblical worldview.”90 Concerned
Women for America strives to “protect and promote Biblical values among all
citizens . . . thereby reversing the decline in moral values in our nation,” where
“women and like-minded men, from all walks of life, [can] come together and
restore the family to its traditional purpose.”91 The mission statement of the
National Organization for Marriage specifies that the group is organized “to
defend marriage and the faith communities that sustain it.”92 The Traditional
Values Coalition states that its role is to press for legislative change based on
“Bible-based traditional values,” including “[p]rotecting traditional marriage
and family as the cornerstone of society” and “[s]ecuring the Constitution
against the growing threat of Islam and Shariah law” on behalf of “like-minded

87

Public Policy and Advocacy, AM. JEWISH COMMITTEE, http://www.ajcwashington.org/site/
c.gpLLJOOtHmE/b.877021/k.5C34/Public_Policy__Advocacy.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
88 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 14.
89 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Family Research Council in Support of Petitioners Addressing the Merits
and Supporting Reversal at 1, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 314462;
Marriage and Family, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/Marriage-and-Family (last visited Mar. 5,
2015); State Family Policy Councils, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/state-policy-organizations (last
visited Mar. 5, 2015) (“Family Policy Councils (FPCs) accomplish at the state level what Family Research
Council does at the national level—shape public debate and formulate public policy.”).
90 About Us, CITIZENLINK, http://www.citizenlink.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
91 Our Mission, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AM., http://www.cwfa.org/about/vision-mission/ (last visited
Mar. 5, 2015).
92 Our Work, NAT’L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE, https://nationformarriage.org/main/ourwork (last visited
Mar. 5, 2015).
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patriots.”93 These mission statements also highlight the next feature of
religious interest groups, unclear identity and representation.
2. Religious Interest Group Identity and Representation
The second salient feature of religious interest groups that requires some
discussion is that although religious interest groups describe themselves as
advancing a specific religious view, that claim obscures difficult questions of
what precisely the “religious interest” comprises, as well as whom the group
represents.94 These complicated, yet interrelated, questions about religious
identity and representation lead to doubts about the plausibility of a religious
view.
These difficulties are not present, or at least less prevalent, in the context of
mainstream secular lobby groups.95 In the context of secular lobby groups, it is
relatively straightforward to identify the interests that secular lobby groups
represent—the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable for
example represent specified businesses in the political sphere.96 These groups
have clearly stated interests and goals, directed by people who agree on the
political agenda and whose success is measured by the nature of the benefits
accruing to the member organizations.97
Identifying both the religious interest and the constituency whom the
religious interest group represents is far more challenging because the religious
interest group can potentially represent up to three different principals at once,
each with variable ideas about the nature of the religious interest that should be
advocated for in the political sphere.98 First, religious interest groups represent
93 About TVC, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION, http://www.traditionalvalues.org/content/about (last
visited Mar. 5, 2015).
94 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 94–116; KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED
STATES 26 (2d ed. 1992).
95 It is, of course, possible to identify various interest groups representing a social issue, for example the
environment, where the lobbyist also represents multiple principals. However, this Article maintains that as a
general matter, this multiple principal issue is of particular significance for religious interest groups given the
inevitable recourse to both a higher power, the hierarchical institutional power responsible for disseminating
the religious message, and the membership body of religious adherents.
96 See About, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, http://businessroundtable.org/about (last visited Mar. 5, 2015); About
the U.S. Chamber, U.S. CHAMBER COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/about-us/about-us-chamber (last
visited Mar. 5, 2015).
97 See Issacaroff & Ortiz, supra note 67.
98 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 95; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 17; see also HANNA FENICHEL
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); REPRESENTATION: ELECTIONS AND BEYOND (Jack H.
Nagel & Rogers M. Smith eds., 2013).

ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2

1060

12/17/2015 8:41 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1041

a sociocultural group—the individuals who profess belief in the tradition on
which the religious interest group relies for its existence and continued
relevance.99 Second, at least in one of their manifestations, religious interest
groups potentially represent a specific religious institution or set of
institutions.100 Finally, religious interest groups represent and depend on a
specific creed or doctrine from which their underlying moral message
derives.101
Religious interest groups vary in how they characterize which actors the
group represents. While the groups almost universally emphasize their ability
to speak to “the religious view,” the groups vary as to how they regard whom
they represent. For example, the formal religious interest group for the
Episcopal Church, the Office of Government Relations, states that they
represent the voice of all Episcopalians.102 Conversely, the American Baptist
National Ministries’ Office of Governmental Relations specifies that they
represent American Baptist Churches USA in the United States.103
The most complicating dimension of the representational claims is arguably
the final dimension: that religious lobbyists not only represent the individuals
and institutions that tasked them with a public policy agenda, but they are also
called to represent and remain faithful to a theological tradition.104 This is an
additional burden over and above being responsive to member individuals or
institutions, and there is an expectation that at all times the religious interest
groups will be responsive and faithful to the demands of a religious faith. The
problem is, of course, that any understanding of a particular faith-based
perspective necessarily differs member to member, and institution to
institution.
99

See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 95; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 17.
See, e.g., Rachel Kraus, Laity, Institution, Theology, or Politics? Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish
Washington Offices’ Agenda Setting, 68 SOC. RELIGION 67 (2007); see also supra notes 67–80 and
accompanying text (describing the different forms of religious interest groups).
101 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 17.
102 Episcopal Church, Office of Government Relations Mission Statement, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION &
PUB. LIFE PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-advocacy/episcopal-church-office-of-governmentrelations/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
103 American Baptist Churches USA, National Ministries’ Office of Governmental Relations Mission
Statement, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religiousadvocacy/american-baptist-churches-usa-national-ministries-office-of-governmental-relations/ (last visited
Mar. 5, 2015).
104 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 104–111; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 17. See generally ALLEN D.
HERTZKE, ECHOES OF DISCONTENT: JESSE JACKSON, PAT ROBERTSON, AND THE RESURGENCE OF POPULISM
(1993) (analyzing Jackson’s and Robertson’s presidential campaigns, which emphasized a need to address
national moral and economic crises, and how their parties responded to these campaigns).
100
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3. Opaque Membership and Operations
Related to the unclear identity and representation of religious interest
groups, religious interest groups are often opaque in both their operations and
their membership.105 Although an entrenched part of the political process, by
and large religious interest groups are private entities and therefore not subject
to the standard mechanisms of making government open to the public. While
religious interest groups are directly analogous to formal lobbying groups,
possessing the same indicia in terms of formation, interest-based agenda, and
action, religious interest groups are generally not subject to the formal
disclosure requirements of lobbying groups.
Pursuant to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995106 (LDA), lobbyists are
required to formally register as lobbyists and report communications with the
political branches of government, as well as monies spent and received in
attempts to influence government behavior.107 The LDA, however, provides
for a number of limited exceptions, including lobbying communications made
by “a church, its integrated auxiliary, or a convention or association of
churches that is exempt from filing a Federal income tax return,” as well as “a
religious order.”108 Pursuant to these exceptions, the only instance where a
religious interest group that falls within this definition must disclose their
lobbying is if it spends a “substantial” amount of money on lobbying, if more
than twenty percent of its lobbyists income is from direct lobbying, or if it
hires an outside lobbying firm.109 Because churches and their directly related
religious interest groups are tax-exempt, they largely avoid the attention of the
105

See LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 53, 55.
Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614 (2012)).
107 Id. Other significant federal lobbying laws include the Byrd Amendment. See 31 U.S.C. § 1352 (2012)
(prohibiting the use of funds appropriated by Congress to lobby for any type of a federal award); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 5
(William V. Luneburg et. al. eds., 4th ed. 2009) (describing the history for federal lobbying regulation);
Thomas M. Susman & William V. Luneberg, History of Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals Since 1955, in
THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra, at 23 (describing the history for federal lobbying regulation); Richard L.
Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012) (analyzing the
constitutionality of lobbying reform).
108 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(B)(xviii)(I)–(II); see also Zachary Newkirk, God’s Lobbyists: The Hidden Realm
of Religious Influence, OPENSECRETS BLOG (July 13, 2011), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/07/godslobbyists.html.
109 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); SENATE OFFICE OF PUB. RECORDS & HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RES. CTR.,
LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT GUIDANCE (2014), available at http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/
ldaguidance.pdf; David C. Vladeck, Special Considerations for Lobbying by Nonprofit Corporations, in THE
LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 107, at 401; see also infra Part IV.C (describing the possibilities for reforming
these restrictions).
106
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Internal Revenue Service, and it is extremely rare for the IRS to examine
whether the church has spent a “substantial” amount of money on lobbying.110
Those religious interest groups that are exempt from the lobbying
disclosure requirements are generally not voluntarily forthcoming. Most
groups do not publicize a list of members, nor do they disclose the
involvement or participation in interest group activities of their members.111
There are exceptions. For example, the Friends Committee on National
Legislation, a nonprofit founded by members of the Society of Friends (i.e., the
Quaker church), voluntarily discloses its lobbying expenditures annually. In an
email to the website OpenSecrets Blog, a representative of the interest group
stated that “Quakers value integrity and truth-telling highly, so we willingly
disclose our lobbying activities.”112 Apart from these exceptional groups, most
information about the internal operations of religious interest groups, as well as
their membership, is garnered from surveys and inside information.113
4. Distinctive Nature of Lobbying
The fourth important feature of religious interest groups is that they engage
in a form of lobbying that is largely distinct from the lobbying of standard
interest groups. Standard lobby groups typically advocate for the governmental
enactment of either regulation to curb behaviors affecting their members (e.g.,
unfair competition policy or prohibition of fraudulent advertising), distributive
policies to ensure members receive some tangible government aid (e.g., tariffs
110 See supra notes 107–09 (discussing the Lobbying Disclosure Act); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing
the interaction between tax exemptions for churches pursuant to the Internal Revenue Service Code and the
exemptions under the Lobbying Disclosure Act). The National Association of Evangelicals has implicitly
spoken to the exemption for these organizational forms from lobbying requirements. In its publication “For the
Health of the Nation,” the group stated in its preamble that:

Evangelical Christians in America face a historic opportunity. We make up fully one quarter of
all voters in the most powerful nation in history. Never before has God given American
evangelicals such an awesome opportunity to shape public policy . . . . The First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause is directed only at government and restrains its power. Thus, for example,
the clause was never intended to shield individuals from exposure to the religious views of
nongovernmental speakers. Exemptions from regulations or tax burdens do not violate the
Establishment Clause, for government does not establish religion by leaving it alone.
NAT’L ASS’N OF EVANGELICALS, FOR THE HEALTH OF THE NATION: AN EVANGELICAL CALL TO CIVIC
RESPONSIBILITY (2004), http://www.nae.net/images/content/For_The_Health_Of_The_Nation.pdf.
111 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 149–52.
112 Newkirk, supra note 108.
113 See, e.g., LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 53 (detailing how statistics on religious
interest groups are not consistently reported, therefore information was obtained from “websites,
questionnaires and interviews”).
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and subsidies), redistributive policies (e.g., social security), or constituent
policy to control power within the government (e.g., apportionment).114 The
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) is a prominent example
of a lobby group that pursues at least one of these types of typical policies. For
example, the NFIB is well known for its attempts to force regulatory policy in
the interests of its members—small businesses. The NFIB has been actively
pressuring the federal government to repeal the employer mandate provision in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in order to protect its members
from potentially crippling financial obligations.115 Another example is the
environmental group, National Wildlife Federation, which advocates for
regulatory change to the end of conservation goals, as well as redistributive
policies to fund conservation projects.116
By and large, religious interest groups are distinguishable from standard
lobbying groups.117 Political scientists have aptly named religious interest
groups “radicalized” lobbyists, a descriptor that captures both the nature of the
outcomes sought, as well as the manner in which these outcomes are
pursued.118 The suggestion that religious interest groups are distinct, both in
outcomes sought and behavior engaged in to achieve those outcomes, is
striking and warrants some unpacking.
As a general matter, religious interest groups seek policy that is based on,
and driven by, a particular religious perspective; that is, directly derived from
fundamental faith-based values. The radical lobbyist is motivated by a vision

114 Theodore J. Lowi, Foreword: New Dimensions in Policy and Politics, in SOCIAL REGULATORY
POLICY: MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS, at x, x–xi (Raymond Tatalovich & Byron W. Daynes
eds., 1988). For an excellent overview of the mechanics of lobbying, see Richard L. Hall & Richard Anderson,
Issue Advertising and Legislative Advocacy in Health Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 221 (Allan J.
Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 8th ed. 2012); Burdett A. Loomis, Learning to Lobby: Groups, Venues, and
Information in Eighteenth-Century America, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra, at 37; ANTHONY J. NOWNES,
TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT (AND HOW THEY TRY TO GET IT) (2006).
115 Healthcare Legislative Activity: The Next Steps for Reform, NFIB (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://www.nfib.com/article/healthcare-legislative-activity-the-next-steps-for-reform-1363/.
116 Advocating for Conservation Policy, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, http://www.nwf.org/What-WeDo/Conservation-Policy.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
117 Of course, religious interest groups can, and do, lobby for the typical policies outlined in this section,
for example tax breaks. However, religious interest groups also lobby for fundamental change to generally
applicable laws, driven by a religious viewpoint. It is this aspect of religious lobbying that is the core focus of
this Article.
118 See, e.g., HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55–57; Lowi, supra note 114, at xii–xiv.
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of the state that is based on a particular version of a religious tradition.119
Initially, this may not seem concerning. There seems nothing uniquely
troubling about advocating for policies directed by a particular faith-based
vision of how the law should work. Superficially, this seems to be the epitome
of pluralism in politics, where citizens and their advocates have the
opportunity—and indeed, the right—to present their views from whatever
perspective motivates them. However, once we dig a little deeper, it is possible
to see that the image of citizens presenting their religious viewpoint to the
collective for consideration is based on idealized assumptions about religion
and a thin understanding of religious interest groups as facilitators of religious
participation in the political process.
Interest groups are formed to seek outcomes reflective of their members’
interests, not to ensure a participatory voice in the political process. Religious
interest groups are no different in this regard, and religious interest groups are
formed to lobby for the best outcomes for the religious group.120 While there
are many reasons why religious groups are politically active, the core reason is
that many churches feel that it is their responsibility to influence politics with
their morals and values.121 For example, the former head of the religious
interest group Bread for the World stated that “the Christian faith and moral
teaching have implications for politics. Churches should be active in bringing
those values to bear in political life.”122 For many religious institutions and
religious individuals, tasking religious interest groups with bringing religious
values to the political forum is a way of ensuring that society is just, and that
members of society are guided “in distinguishing right from wrong, whether
practical in, or out of government.”123
This is not a participatory goal. Instead, just as standard interest groups are
driven by results in terms of outcomes reflective of the perspectives of their
members, so too are religious groups driven by forcing outcomes reflective of
119 See W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY, POWER AND CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 97–98 (3d
ed. 1993) (discussing the distinction between mainstream incremental lobbying and radical politics);
HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55.
120 See, e.g., EBERSOLE, supra note 9; HERTZKE, supra note 9; HOFRENNING, supra note 9.
121 See Dean M. Kelley, The Rationale for the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic, in THE ROLE
OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 159 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1991); Erik J.
Ablin, Student Article, The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church Participation in
Political Campaigns, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 573 (1999).
122 Ablin, supra note 121, at 573 (quoting Julia McCord, Election Guide Suit Sparks Debate About
Election Guidelines, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 24, 1996, at 63SF) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 Id. at 574 (quoting Tony Maggio, Editorial, Churches Help Distinguish Right, Wrong, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, July 26, 1997, at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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their members’ religious perspective. For example, the Association of Jesuit
Colleges and Universities states that it represents the interests of American’s
twenty-eight Jesuit colleges and universities and that those interests include
congressional appropriations, budget, higher education authorization issues,
and taxes.124 Similarly, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB) Office of Governmental Relations (OGR) specifies that it represents
the hierarchy of Catholic bishops within the United States and U.S. Virgin
Islands. The interests of the USCCB advocated for by the OGR include
prohibition of same-sex marriage, prohibition of abortion, Catholic education,
and international justice and peace.125 Once we start to view religious interest
groups as driven to an end, rather than being satisfied with participating in the
political milieu, the particular concern about religious interest groups
specifically—and the reason why political scientists refer to them as “radical”
lobbyists—becomes more apparent.
It is precisely because of the moral outcomes that religious interest groups
seek that religious interest groups are “radical.” The self-interest that drives
religious interest groups is based on a particular vision of the world and the
law that is based in religion. Religion, by definition, is an issue of faith.126
There are a multitude of religious traditions and practices throughout the
United States. Indeed, the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses were enacted
to protect the rights of Americans to freely believe and practice in whatever
faith tradition moves them. Ultimately, religious interest groups advocate to
entrench one specific religious perspective into law; they are motivated by a
vision in which their specific religious values dominate the state.127 Thus,
while religious interest groups look like standard interest groups, working to
exert pressure in the classic sense, religious interest groups seek outcomes that
are entirely different from classic interest groups. Religious interest groups are
not concerned with material spoils (i.e., classic economic rents), but instead
religious interest groups seek change in the law based on their own religious
understanding.128 The USCCB is an illuminating example of this. One of the
124

Federal Relations, ASS’N JESUIT COLLEGES & U., http://www.ajcunet.edu/federal (last visited Mar. 5,

2015).
125 Government Relations, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/about/government-relations/
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
126 See Gey, supra note 25, at 451. See generally Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering
the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75
(1990) (arguing that religious expression should only be protected to the same extent as all other forms of
expression).
127 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 107.
128 Id.; see also Lowi, supra note 114, at x–xii.
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USCCB’s interests is resisting legislative change that would permit same-sex
marriage. The USCCB states,
We oppose efforts to make any other personal relationship the
equivalent of marriage in law, regulation, or any other public policy.
We will oppose measures that seek to redefine or erode the meaning
of marriage. The family—based on marriage between a man and a
woman—is the first and fundamental unit of society and is a
sanctuary for the creation and nurturing of children and it should be
129
defended and strengthened.

These religiously based and religiously driven outcomes sought by
religious interest groups drive their behavior in the legislative process.130
Social scientists have shown that the ideological intensity of religious interest
groups is markedly higher than the intensity demonstrated by standard interest
groups, including ideologically driven interest groups.131 The degree of
ideological intensity matters because it is determinative in what constitutes an
acceptable policy outcome. For standard lobbyists, whose ideological intensity
is typically lower than the religious lobbyist, acceptable policy outcomes
include policies that do not directly reflect their ideal policy outcome.132
Instead, standard interest groups recognize that in order to get as close as
possible to their ideal point, coalition with other interest groups and
government officials, and consequently compromise on their ideal point, is
essential to achieve any result.133 This means that consensus is possible, and
legislators can work with a number of different interest groups on the same
policy in an attempt to reduce differences to a point where all interested parties
can be satisfied with the outcome. In other words, these standard interest
groups are willing to accept smaller, more incremental change to the policy
they are seeking to entrench as general law in order to receive a share of the
regulatory outcomes.134
Unlike standard lobby groups, for the religious interest group an acceptable
policy outcome is one that mirrors their ideal policy outcome. As discussed
above, the ideal policy outcome for religious interest groups is the
entrenchment of their religious perspective on the policy at issue. For religious
129

Government Relations, supra note 125.
HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 106–08.
131 See Lowi, supra note 114, at xi; see also HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55–57.
132 See SHIVELY, supra note 119, at 97–98 (discussing the distinction between mainstream incremental
lobbying and radical lobbying).
133 See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 114; NOWNES, supra note 114.
134 See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 114; NOWNES, supra note 114.
130
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lobbyists, consensus and compromise on the ultimate outcome is akin to
trivialization of the religious perspective that drives their advocacy efforts.135
In other words, because religious lobbyists tend to be animated by the view
that the policy that they are advocating for is fundamentally correct in their
religious worldview, any differences with external parties are irreducible. For
the religious lobbyist, the only acceptable outcome is a policy that reflects the
religiously driven policy being presented.136 Unlike standard interest groups,
then, compromise is impossible—the acceptable outcome is one that reflects
the ideal outcome.137 The Presbyterian Office of Public Witness (representing
the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) in Washington), for example, states clearly
that “[i]ts task is to advocate, and help the church to advocate, the social
witness perspectives and policies of the Presbyterian General Assembly.”138 It
further specifies that in order to “remain true to its biblical roots, theological
heritage, and contemporary practice,” it “must not fall silent” and instead
“must speak faithfully, truthfully, persuasively, humbly, boldly and
urgently.”139 The implication is clear—nothing short of the religious viewpoint
proposed by this religious interest group will be acceptable.
Ultimately, then, religious interest groups have different expectations of the
legislative process than standard interest groups. What this refusal to accept
compromise-based change means is that any legislative success of the religious
interest group does not reflect a balance of the views of the represented groups.
Instead, when religious interest groups successfully agitate for a particular
policy outcome, the process becomes winner takes all.140 As leading political
scientist Daniel Hofrenning notes, “Religious lobbyists seek to fundamentally
transform the political and social reality of America. These sweeping goals are
rooted in a religious understanding of the achievement of the kingdom of God
on earth.”141
***
As Parts II and III argue, each of these four features of religious interest
group participation in the political process contributes to the mixed results for
135

See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55; see also Lowi, supra note 114, at x–xii.
HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 52–53.
137 Id.
138 About Us, PRESBYTERIAN MISSION AGENCY, http://www.presbyterianmission.org/ministries/
washington/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
139 Id.
140 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55.
141 Id. at 107.
136
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the values of religious liberty and democracy. As Part II notes, the groups’
commitment to promoting religious goals makes religious interest groups a
strong voice for religious liberty and ensures inclusive participation in the
democratic process. However, as Part III outlines, these features of religious
interest groups ironically obstruct and undermine the goals of religious liberty
and democracy.
II. THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS IN PROMOTING RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY
Part I provided the necessary foundational information on the practices and
features of religious interest groups. The analysis in Parts II and III will draw
on these features of religious interest groups and attempt to demonstrate the
implications and effects of religious interest group involvement in the
legislative process on the goals of enhancing religious liberty and equal
democratic participation and consideration.
Specifically, Part II argues that religious interest groups are generally
reliable advocates for the values of religious liberty and democracy. However,
in Part III I will outline that despite this consistent advocacy, religious interest
groups actually fail to facilitate, and sometimes repress, democratic ideals as
well as compromise the religious liberty of both the religious viewpoints that
they purport to represent and the polity as a whole by effectively capturing
political outcomes.
These diverse—and indeed, contradictory—results reflect deep, latent
tensions in the drive for religious liberty in the American polity between the
various religious interest groups’ goals of protecting their own religious
liberty, seeking a diverse and active religious pluralism as a whole, and being
active participants in the democratic process. The practice of a religious
interest group in advancing the single religious view of the principal it
represents—and their lack of accountability and transparency—facilitates
representation of a religious viewpoint in the political process. But at the same
time, that practice of presenting a single religious position obscures the
diversity of religious views, both within a particular faith tradition and between
religions generally, undermining a broader religious pluralism, and variously
masking internal dissent, policy drift, capture, and disengagement.
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A. Identifying Benefits: Protecting Religious Freedom and Democracy
Religious interest groups are beneficial for religious individuals and
religious institutions because, like interest groups more generally, they
overcome the core problem facing proponents of robust religious participation
in the legislative process: that religious individuals and religious institutions
are not necessarily consistent advocates of either or both their own religious
liberty or participatory rights in the legislative process. Before explaining how
religious interest groups have largely overcome this problem, some elucidation
of the goals of religious participation in the legislative process is required.
Religious participation in the legislative process—and indeed in politics
more generally—is generally justified on one of two grounds: first, that
religious participation advances religious liberty, and second, that religious
participation serves democratic values.142 Each of these justifications requires
some unpacking.
A core contemporary justification for active religious participation in the
legislative process is to advance the value of religious liberty.143 To serve the
value of religious liberty, including the ability of religious citizens to fully
practice their religious faith, it is argued that religious participation in the
legislative process is essential.144 The claim is that exclusion of religious
citizens from the legislative process would violate First Amendment values of
religious freedom.145 Specifically, the claim is that restricting religion and
religious values from political debate violates the right of religious citizens to
freely exercise their religion in America, and is tantamount to establishing
secularism, in contravention of the Establishment Clause.146 In this context,
142 See ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 77 (1997); STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN: THE
WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS (2000); NEUHAUS, supra note 2; McConnell, supra note 2.
143 See, e.g., AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 142, at 105 (stating that for many religious believers it is
not “for them, about something other than their social and political existence; it is also about their social and
political existence”); CARTER, supra note 142, at 25–26 (focusing on the salience of religious argument to
believers); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on
Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1599 (1987) (“When religious morality is
excluded from politics, the religious individual is alienated from public life.”).
144 See, e.g., Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 143, at 1599.
145 See, e.g., id.; McConnell, supra note 2.
146 CARTER, supra note 142, at 3 (“[I]f we build too high the walls that are intended to keep religion out of
politics, we will face religious people who will storm the barricades and declare the government no longer
legitimate . . . .”); Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 143, at 1600 (“If the religious people who constitute the
majority of Americans come to believe, as many already do, that the law making process does not respect their
religious beliefs . . . then they themselves will respect neither the process nor the laws that it generates.”);
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protecting religious liberty means ensuring the right of religious adherents to
participate in the political process. Some additional notes will help to fill out
this idea.
For most proponents of a politically active religious life, the idea that they
cannot participate in the legislative process publically devalues their faith.147
Government inevitably makes decisions on moral issues that are salient for
many believers, for example abortion, same-sex marriage, wealth
redistribution, and the death penalty. At some point, the people will be asked to
use their moral judgments to determine their own responses as well as direct
the governmental response. Religion frequently plays a role in determining
these responses.148 Some commentators claim that as people debate and engage
in difficult moral questions, restricting religious participation is necessarily a
restriction on that person’s religious liberty to freely act on her religious
beliefs.149 For these commentators, restricting religion in this way unfairly
singles out religion for discriminatory treatment. In doing so, the liberty of
religious citizens is affected in a way that the liberty of nonreligious citizens is
not.150 While there have been some concerns voiced that religious participation
in politics will impose on the liberty of non-adherents, the response is simply
that inclusion in political debate is necessary for the liberty of religious
adherents, and the liberty of non-adherents is unaffected because mere
participation does not dictate policy outcomes.151 That is, religious arguments
McConnell, supra note 2, at 650 (positing that restrictions on religious political argument “will deepen the
anger and hostility that [religious] citizens feel toward the hegemonic and exclusionary practices of the secular
power structure”).
147 See, e.g., Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 143, at 1600 (“If the religious people who constitute the
majority of Americans come to believe, as many already do, that the law making process does not respect their
religious beliefs . . . then they themselves will respect neither the process nor the laws that it generates.”).
148 See, e.g., Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993) (discussing the exclusion of religion from public debate).
149 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 142, at 25–26 (focusing on the salience of religious argument to
believers).
150 See, e.g., AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 142, at 72–76 (arguing that liberal calls to exclude
religious argument from public political debate violate the fundamental liberal commitment to equal freedom);
Jason Carter, Toward a Genuine Debate About Morals, Religion, Politics, and Law: Why America Needs a
Christian Response to the “Christian” Right, 41 GA. L. REV. 69, 82 (2006) (rejecting as unfair to religious
believers the idea of excluding religious arguments because they might alienate nonbelievers); Hollenbach,
supra note 2, at 897 (“Persons or groups should not face political disability or disenfranchisement simply
because their political views are rooted in religious traditions and beliefs.”); Gregory P. Magarian, Religious
Argument, Free Speech Theory, and Democratic Dynamism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119, 133–34 (2011);
Michael J. Perry, Liberal Democracy and Religious Morality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 18 (1998) (arguing that
the morality and ethics of liberal democracy do not require religious believers to forego reliance on religious
arguments in making political decisions).
151 Magarian, supra note 150, at 133–34.
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simply make “one contribution among others in a debate on how political
power is to be used.”152
In addition to the protection of religious liberty, most defenses of the right
of religious citizens to engage in the political process claim that the democratic
process is undermined by the exclusion of religious viewpoints.153 That is, to
safeguard the democratic structures and to ensure politics is appropriately
representative, the claim is that religious citizens must retain the ability to
engage in the political process.154 Removing religion from politics actively
threatens American democracy. Richard Neuhaus, for example, claims that
removing religion from the public domain would result in secularism—a
“naked public square” that is far more dangerous to democracy than
religion.155 For Neuhaus and others, taken to its logical limits, the absence of
religion from the public square prefigures a totalitarian state.156
While I outline in depth the baseline arguments for excluding religion as
detrimental to the democratic processes in Part III below,157 given that so much
of the defense of religion’s role in the legislative process is a response to
arguments for excluding religion from politics, it is worth briefly noting the
core objection here. The basis for the desire to exclude religion from the
political processes is that religious participation uniquely burdens
non-adherents in political debates.158 Religiously based arguments are simply
inaccessible to non-adherents given that faith, as the word implies, is based on
a deep and personal comprehensive understanding of the world. Any debate,
then, is stymied by religious arguments, because faith is undebatable.159 If in a
debate over a hypothetical bill to ban the eating of any animal products, a
claim is made that “humans should not eat animals because God says that

152

Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 841

(1993).
153

See supra note 146.
See NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 27 (arguing that the resulting secularism from a “naked public square”
is more dangerous to democracy than religion, and taken to its logical limits, the absence of religion from the
public square prefigures a totalitarian state).
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See infra Part III.B.
158 See especially KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 2005); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
159 See GREENAWALT, supra note 158; Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 16 (1989)
(arguing for a principle of “conversational restraint”); Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and
the Obligation of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989).
154
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ingesting the flesh of another animal is inhumane,” it is impossible to engage
with that perspective. If “God said so,” then the debate is over, at least as far as
the religious participant is concerned. According to this view, the legislative
process is obstructed by religious participants—the process depends on debate
and consensus building, and to the extent that religion is a “conversation
stopper,” it is in many ways, antidemocratic.160
Defenders of religious participation in the political process reject this claim
outright. They claim that the idea that religious claims are inaccessible, and
therefore undemocratic, smacks of secularism.161 For these commentators,
there is no way to distinguish religious-based advocacy for a particular policy
from a nonreligious perspective, at least in terms of accessibility. Both
religious and nonreligious arguments for and against legislation suffer from the
same infirmities as people who have no understanding of the basis of a
person’s claims. For example, in a debate over climate change, a scientist may
make a claim that global warming is a scientific fact based on specialized
scientific data, a religious person might claim that there is no such thing as
global warming because the Bible says that God will protect the earth, and
another person might claim that in her hometown, the climate has remained
steady for twenty-five years. For each of these perspectives, everyone involved
in the debate can listen to or read about the basis for the arguments.162
Religious arguments, it is claimed, are not uniquely inaccessible. Conversely,
the value of including the religious perspective in politics is that it enables all
citizens to participate in the democratic process.
These two goals of protecting religious liberty and democracy are typically
proposed by commentators as the reasons why religious participation in
politics is valuable. The next section considers the unique prowess of religious
interest groups in implementing these goals.

160 See RICHARD RORTY, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 168
(1999); see also William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY 96, 102 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
161 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 142.
162 See NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 19 (“Christian truth, if it is true, is public truth. It is accessible to public
reason.”); McConnell, supra note 2, at 649–51 (characterizing most religious traditions as based on exegesis of
sources that nonbelievers can study, such as natural law for Catholics and the Bible for fundamentalist
Protestants); Steven Shiffrin, Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631, 1639 (1999) (arguing
that nonbelievers can access any source of religious knowledge, including claims of divine inspiration);
Waldron, supra note 152, at 835–36 (discussing comprehensibility of unfamiliar grounds for argument under
an Aristotelian conception of public discourse).
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B. The Success of Religious Interest Groups in Progressing Religious
Interests
As Part I explains, religious interest groups actively focus on the goals of
religious liberty and democratic participation of religious individuals and
organizations.163 Religious interest groups have a long-term commitment to
advocating for the rights of religious Americans to participate in, and
influence, the legislative process, channeling these commitments through
various lobbying efforts. It is valuable, then, to elaborate on how religious
interest groups are effective in advancing each of these interests.
1. Religious Interest Groups and Democratic Participation
In the first instance, religious interest groups are critical to ensuring that
religious individuals and churches are active participants in the democratic
process. Religious interest groups have immediate access to a wide
membership base. This is particularly so in the case of the lobbying arms of
churches or denominations—such as the Episcopal Church’s Office of
Government Relations, representing the Episcopalian Church164—or
affiliations of churches or denominations—for example the Jewish Federation
of North America, representing a number of Jewish federations and
independent communities.165
Generally speaking, the membership of these churches and other
denominational houses of worship is widespread, diverse, and extensive.166
Surveys put membership in religious institutions at almost 60% of the
American population.167 The presence of a related lobbying group, then, at
163

See supra Part I.B.
Episcopal Church, Office of Government Relations Mission Statement, supra note 102.
165 About Us: The Jewish Federations of North America’s Washington Office, JEWISH FED’NS N. AM.,
http://www.jewishfederations.org/washington-office.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
166 See, e.g., GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE’S RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH IN THE
90’S 16 (1989); HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 71; ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); WILLARD L. SPERRY,
RELIGION IN AMERICA (1946); David A. Gay & John P. Lynxwiler, Cohort, Spirituality, and Religiosity: A
Cross-Sectional Comparison, 15 J. RELIGION & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2013, at 1, 7–11, available at
https://dspace.creighton.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10504/64325/2013-25.pdf.
167 See Religion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015)
(noting that in 2014, 59% of respondents indicated they were a “member of a church or synagogue”); see also
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY:
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 5–6 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/
pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf (noting that only 16.1% of survey respondents indicated that they
were unaffiliated with a religion).
164
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least facially makes American politics more democratic by involving ordinary
citizens, whose interests on social issues might otherwise go unrepresented, in
the political process.168 That is, individuals who might never have had a voice
in the political sphere are, by virtue of their membership in a church or other
denomination represented by a religious interest group, captured into a
collective and ostensibly given a voice on the political stage.169 That religious
interest groups purport to represent each member of the laity has been
demonstrated by social scientists and is apparent from a sampling of statements
of the lobby affiliates of the churches. For example, the Episcopal Church
affiliate lobby group, the Office of Government Relations, claims to represent
all Episcopalian voices in policymaking,170 and Agudath Israel of America’s
Office of Government Affairs purports to represent Orthodox Jewish
communities and to protect the rights and advance the interests of observant
Jews more generally.171
More specifically, given that membership in religious institutions is
dominated by America’s lowest income earners,172 the politicization of
organized religion can enable more citizens outside of the highest income
earners to participate in politics. As one political scientist notes, “[I]dentifiable
religious societies are important for interest group theory partially because they
are by far the largest non-elite group in the nation.”173 As the political
representatives of churches, then, religious interest groups have the potential to
make lobbyists generally more representative of non-elite and non-monied
citizens.
Of course, these high levels of membership do not necessarily equate to
high levels of participation or influence. In national politics, where money
buys entry and therefore influence, the combined amount that religious interest
groups spend on lobbying—$350 million—is only a very small portion of total

168 See Mihuţ, supra note 1, at 46 (claiming that interest groups “have stimulated the representation of
various categories of people before the government and have facilitated political participation”).
169 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 73–75.
170 Episcopal Church, Office of Government Relations Mission Statement, supra note 102.
171 Agudath Israel of America, Office of Government Affairs Mission Statement, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION
& PUB. LIFE PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-advocacy/agudath-israel-of-america-office-ofgovernment-affairs/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
172 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 12; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 71; JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS 60 (1995).
173 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also HOFRENNING, supra note 9,
at 201; Weber & Stanley, supra note 9, at 29.

ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

12/17/2015 8:41 AM

LOBBYING IN THE SHADOWS

1075

interest group expenditure.174 In addition, while membership in churches and
other denominations is high, because most citizens typically do not join
religious institutions for political or policy reasons, individual members are
unlikely to actively participate in any political activities of the institution.175
Instead, most individuals join a religious institution to deepen their faith, meet
friends, or provide educational opportunities for their children.176 Indeed, many
individuals are unaware that their church has a religious lobbying group
purporting to represent their interests at all, and some in fact have deep
objections to political involvement by their church.177 A recent Pew Research
Center poll, for example, notes that more than half of Americans believe that
religious institutions should not express views on social and political
questions.178
Despite this small overall presence in politics in terms of dollars spent, and
the low levels of active participation of the members, religious interest groups
remain powerful participants in the democratic process—and ensure that
religious voices are among the most influential in the legislative process—as a
consequence of two related factors.
First, despite the ambivalence of many members of religious institutions to
the political functions of the affiliated lobby group, the sheer size of many of
the represented churches and denominations is influential in Washington.179
Even though members might not be actively engaged, the simple fact that
religious interest groups represent almost 60% the American population

174 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 14 (estimating that the combined religious group
expenditure exceeds $350 million annually). In 2013, approximately $3.24 billion was spent on lobbying
efforts in the United States. See Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
index.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
175 See, e.g., Katherine E. Stenger, The Underrepresentation of Liberal Christians: Mobilization
Strategies of Religious Interest Groups, 42 SOC. SCI. J. 391, 392 (“[L]iberal Christians are underrepresented in
individual membership-based Christian interest groups.”).
176 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 76; see also PUTNAM, supra note 166; ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E.
CAMPBELL WITH SHAYLYN ROMNEY GARRETT, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US
(2010).
177 See, e.g., Roy Beck, National Religious Lobbying, SOC. CONT. J., Spring 1995, at 160, 162, available
at http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc0503/article_430.shtml (“[M]ost members in their
local pews have no idea of what lobbying is done on their behalf in Washington.”).
178 Michael Lipka, 5 Takeaways About Religion and Politics Before the Midterms, PEW RES. CENTER
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/22/5-takeaways-about-religion-and-politicsbefore-the-midterms/.
179 But see HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 145–46.
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provides latent strength to the religious lobbyist.180 Politicians are rational
actors and their behaviors necessarily recognize that responding to religious
interest groups that represent large voting blocs will result in a higher chance
of reelection.181 To maximize the opportunity for reelection, a legislator will
necessarily attempt to help those groups that will attract the most votes for the
legislator.182 That is, as a consequence of the number of electors that the
religious interest groups purportedly represent, government officials, and even
other lobbyists, may defer to religious interest groups, ensuring the religious
person some form of participation in the legislative process.
Second, the subject matter of religious lobbying necessarily ensures at least
some level of participation in the legislative process. Religion has historic
salience for the American psyche that holds today.183 It is difficult to rebuff
claims that are based on a principled and moralistic vision of the law, derived
from the word of God. Consider the rhetorical power in this statement by the
legislative director of Concerned Women for America:
The most basic reason for the existence of Concerned Women for
America is to preserve and protect the traditional American family
through Judeo-Christian values. We are concerned with those forces
which tend to weaken the traditional family. . . . We are looking to
preserve the existing laws that we consider to be compatible with our
values which are Biblically based and then trying to expose the new
trends or movements that come along that would make it difficult for
184
those who want to hold those values and continue to keep them.

This prophetic basis for the goods that the religious lobbyist wishes to
exact from the state is powerful. While standard interest groups rely solely on
the concerns of their members and institutions for their authority, religious
interest groups have the additional authority of a tradition of faith.185 Religious
interest groups, then, present demands that have as their basis a higher power,
180 See Paul A. Djupe & Laura R. Olson, A Meditation on and Meta-analysis of the Public Presence of
Religious Interests, in RELIGIOUS INTERESTS IN COMMUNITY CONFLICT: BEYOND THE CULTURE WARS 253,
266 (Paul A. Djupe & Laura R. Olson eds., 2007) (“There is, simply put, an enormous amount of political and
social capital stored in individuals and organizations with religious ties.”).
181 See Robinson, supra note 13, at 149.
182 Id.
183 GUTTERMAN, supra note 50, at 2–3; MARTIN E. MARTY WITH JONATHAN MOORE, POLITICS, RELIGION,
AND THE COMMON GOOD: ADVANCING A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN CONVERSATION ABOUT RELIGION’S ROLE IN
OUR SHARED LIFE 43 (2000); PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 1.
184 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 106 (alteration in original) (quoting Interview by Daniel J.B.
Hofrenning with Sally White, former Legislative Director, Concerned Women for America (June 1989)).
185 See id.
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rooted in faith principles. Combined with the powerful membership base
outlined above, the origins of authority for the legislative good sought by the
lobbyist almost ensures the religious voice a permanent seat at the proverbial
table, entrenching the religious voice in the democratic process.186
2. Religious Interest Groups and Religious Liberty
In addition to the prowess of religious interest groups in increasing
democratic participation of religious Americans, religious interest groups
increase the substantive religious liberty of those members that they represent.
To begin, religious interest groups are single-mindedly focused on
entrenching and protecting the religious liberty of the members that they
represent. Acting alone, it is difficult for individuals, or even some smaller
churches, to have their voices heard on the national scene. Having overcome
collective action problems and the challenges of group formation and
membership, religious interest groups can reap the benefits of collectively
pursuing shared religiously driven interests.187 For many commentators, the
existence of diverse and vigorous religious interest groups safeguards
individual religious liberty.188 Religious interest groups, then, act as mediating
institutions between individuals or churches and the state,189 serving to protect
the liberty interests of an “otherwise powerless individual against the
bureaucracy and coercion of the powerful modern state.”190
Religious liberty is a subjective ideal; while religious liberty might mean
preservation of certain privacy rights for one individual or group, it may mean
the right to government funding for another group. Generally, the idea of
religious liberty is pursued by religious lobbyists across one of three
dimensions. First, religious interest groups advocate for protection of discrete
liberty interests for their members. By this I mean that religious lobbyists
endeavor to protect the rights of their members to engage in religiously

186

See generally Robinson, supra note 13.
On the benefits of collective action, see, for example, MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the
Evolution of Social Norms, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 137.
188 Gedicks, supra note 2, at 118.
189 See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 3.
190 Gedicks, supra note 2, at 115.
187
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motivated actions by entrenching accommodations from generally applicable
laws.191
A salient example of this kind of liberty-based lobbying can be seen across
a number of diverse areas of the law, including the early Quaker lobby and its
advocacy for exemptions from conscription laws.192 With the advent of the
Civil War came the first national effort to draft men into national service. The
original conscription bill of 1863 did not mention conscientious objectors, but
following strong lobbying efforts, an amended bill was proposed that allowed a
drafted person to pay an equivalent of $300 for a substitute.193 Many Quakers
objected to the payment for a substitute and lobbying again resulted in an
amendment so that Quakers could serve as noncombatants.194 A multitude of
amendments followed and the conscientious objector provision remains today,
albeit in a more modern format.195 A more modern example of the success of
religious interest groups in advocating for discrete accommodations from
generally applicable laws is the success of the Jewish lobby in securing an
exemption from the Humane Slaughter Act.196 Not only did Congress amend
the bill to include an exemption for ritualistic slaughtering, but it also
contained a statement that ritualistic slaughtering is “one of the most humane
methods yet devised.”197 The resulting legislation included a statement that the

191 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-5, at 1169 (2d ed. 1988); Ira C. Lupu,
The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV 743 (1992); Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1985); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992). Ira Lupu notes
that “accommodation . . . [is] the central motif of religion clause thought.” Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555,
556 (1991).
192 Fisher, supra note 17, at 292–93; Robinson, supra note 13, at 156.
193 See Enrollment Act, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 731, 733 (1863). For the congressional debate over the
inclusion of an exemption that would satisfy the Quakers and the Shakers, see CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D
SESS. 994 (1863).
194 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9. On conscientious objectors in the civil war, see, for
example, EDWARD NEEDLES WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR (1931).
195 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1300.06, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS (2007), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf; see also Mathew B. Tully, Ask the Lawyer:
Applying for Conscientious Objector Status, MIL. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014, 2:14 PM EST),
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/benefits/2014/12/22/ask-lawyer-conscientiousobjector/20767753/.
196 Pub. L. No. 85-765, § 2(b), 72 Stat. 862, 862 (1958). Louis Fisher notes that at the time of the Act’s
passage, many companies were following old slaughtering methods of hoisting the animal by a single hind leg,
and moving it into a “sticker,” who knifed the jugular vein (which would not kill the animal, only cause it to
bleed), and “knockers,” who swung sledge hammers into the animal’s head. FISHER, supra note 17, at 308.
197 104 CONG. REC. 1654 (1958); see also Robinson, supra note 13, at 166.
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law was in no way intended to “prohibit, abridge, or in any way hinder the
religious freedom of any person or group.”198
The second dimension across which religious liberty is pursued by
religious interest groups is collective lobbying for the religious liberty of
multiple faiths. The best example of this is the collective lobbying efforts of
nearly all religious interest groups to urge the passage of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).199 Following a decision of the Supreme
Court that there were no constitutionally mandated exemptions from generally
applicable and neutrally expressed laws,200 religious interest groups as diverse
as Americans United, the American Center for Law and Justice, the Christian
Legal Society, the American Jewish Congress, and the National Association of
Evangelicals joined together to lobby Congress to pass RFRA.201 The results
were astounding, with RFRA passing the House of Representatives without
opposition and the Senate with a near unanimous, 97–3 vote.202 However, this
kind of unified pursuit for broad religious liberty is rare.203
The third and final dimension across which religious liberty is pursued by
lobbyists is the entrenchment of religious ideals into generally applicable law.
While the pursuit of societal liberty in the image from a specific religious
perspective has strong historic roots, this type of liberty-enforcing lobbying has

198

§ 6, 72 Stat. at 864.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated in part by
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the applicability of the Act to the States and States’
subdivisions); see also Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2377 (Nov. 16, 1993).
200 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882, 884 (1990) (holding that any special accommodation for
religious practice is not constitutionally mandated except where a claim that combines a free exercise claim
and a claim arising from other constitutional provisions—“hybrid” claims—and claims in contexts that “invite
consideration of the particular circumstances”). For commentary on the “exceptions” to the Smith doctrine, see
especially 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 80–81
(2006) (noting that Smith “marks a crucial divide in free exercise law”); Robinson, supra note 13, at 139–40.
201 There was broad unification between Democrats, Republicans, the ACLU, Americans United,
American Center for Law and Justice, the Christian Legal Society, the American Jewish Congress, and the
National Association of Evangelicals. On this point, see FISHER, supra note 17, at 80; MICHAEL W.
MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. 2006).
202 The House Judiciary Committee passed the Act unanimously, and the Act cleared the rest of the House
with the rules suspended (which in turn requires a two-thirds majority). Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law
Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-practices.html; see Fisher, supra note 17, at 314–15;
Robinson, supra note 13, at 142.
203 See generally Robinson, supra note 13 (discussing this point in the context of a religious
organization’s political power).
199
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grown exponentially since the late 1970s and early 1980s.204 Examples can
best illuminate this dimension of lobbying for liberty. We can draw on the
history of religious interest groups outlined in Part I for an early illustration.205
One example is the temperance movement, when churches and groups
comprised of religious individuals organized to advocate Congress for the
prohibition of alcohol, a law that would be applicable to all Americans. For
these lobbyists, “liquor traffic is . . . a crime against God” and “subversive of
every interest in society,” and to that end, the lobbyists called for “legislation
as shall secure this end” with “prohibition to be essential to the full triumph of
this reform.”206
A more modern example is the advocacy by religious interest groups for
the prohibition, or strong restriction, of abortion. Religious interest groups
including Priests for Life, Texas Right to Life, Concerned Women of America
for Texas, and Texas Alliance for Life actively pursue the restriction of the
availability of abortions in America.207 The influence that these lobbyists have
had on legislators, and consequently generally applicable laws, are visible in
numerous jurisdictions across the country. A key example is in Texas, where,
on July 18, 2013, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law legislation that
severely limits access to abortion.208 One of the bill’s sponsors, Representative
Jodie Laubenberg, commented that the bill was a consequence of “the hand of
God,”209 and another sponsor, Senator Glenn Hegar, stated that the “power of
204

See supra notes 48–61 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of the religious lobby in
Washington post-1970).
205 See supra Part I.A (discussing the history of religious interest groups).
206 ODEGARD, supra note 37, at 38 (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION, supra
note 37, at 651); see also FOSTER, supra note 26, at 36, 86, 170; LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10,
at 23.
207 See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Texas Governor Rick Perry Signs Bill Banning Late-Term Abortions,
LIFENEWS.COM (July 18, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/2013/07/18/texas-governor-rick-perrysigns-bill-banning-late-term-abortions/ (referencing the Priests for Life involvement in the passage of the bill);
Joan E. Greve, Rick Perry Signs Restrictive Abortion Bill into Law, ABC NEWS (July 18, 2013, 2:28 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/rick-perry-signs-restrictive-abortion-bill-into-law/ (referencing
the involvement of Texas Right to Life, Texas Alliance for Life, Concerned Women for America of Texas, and
40 Days for Life).
208 Act of July 18, 2013, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 5013. For the official report of the signing statement, see
Governor Rick Perry, Remarks at House Bill 2 Signing (July 18, 2013), available at
http://governor.state.tx.us/news/speech/18757/. See also Christy Hoppe, Texas Gov. Rick Perry Signs Most
Restrictive Abortion Law in Nation, DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 18, 2013, 12:29 PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/20130718-texas-gov.-rick-perry-signs-most-restrictive-abortion-law-innation.ece; Rick Perry Signs Texas Abortion Bill into Law, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2013, 16:13 ET),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23368980.
209 Will Weissert, Gov. Perry Signs Sweeping Abortion Restrictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 18, 2013,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/18/perry-signs-abortion-regulations/
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prayer that day was immense.”210 Governor Perry and other speakers at the
signing ceremony praised the churches that supported the bill.211
All of these lobbying efforts come with tradeoffs. Part III explains how
religious interest groups’ advocacy for religious liberty can suppress the
religious liberty of Americans as a whole and potentially affects the democratic
rights of all citizens.
III. ASSESSING COSTS: HOW RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS HARM RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
The analysis in Part II showed that religious interest groups are beneficial
for religious individuals and religious institutions in terms of securing the
participation of religious persons in the legislative process, as well as the
religious liberty of their members. This Part examines the other side of the
ledger and claims that despite these benefits, religious interest groups both fail
to achieve—and may actually repress—the stated goals of democratic
participation and religious liberty. As I stated above, once we consider the
costs of religious interest groups alongside the benefits, we can see the deeper
tensions in the drive for religious liberty and the participatory rights of
religious persons.
In demonstrating these adverse effects, this Part draws on claims of
commentators that religion in politics generally results in negative outcomes
for both democracy and liberty. To this end, section A outlines the general
concerns about the presence of religion in the political process for liberty and
democracy, before sections B and C narrow the focus to consider how the
pathologies of religious interest groups amplify these general concerns and
result in specific costs to both democracy and religious liberty.

2551347/; see also Bonnie Pritchett, Abortion Bill Signing Undaunted by Ongoing Protests, S. BAPTIST TEXAN
(July 22, 2013), http://texanonline.net/archives/4647/.
210 David Mildenberg, Perry Signs Abortion Law as Texas Lawmakers Thank God, BLOOMBERG (July 18,
2013, 2:23 PM EST), http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2013-07-18/texas-abortion-law/.
211 Id. A decision regarding the constitutionality of a hotly contested portion of the law, which requires
any clinic performing abortions to meet stringent medical standards, is expected from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the coming months. See Carrie Feibel, Texas Abortion Case May Hinge on
Definition of ‘Undue Burden,’ NPR (Jan. 8, 2015, 12:28 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/
2015/01/08/375725066/texas-abortion-case-may-hinge-on-definition-of-undue-burden.
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A. General Principles: The Danger of Religion and the Need for Constraint
Religious interest groups present particular immediate dangers for both
religious liberty and democratic participation. Explaining how religious
interest groups are especially dangerous for these goals requires a brief
description of the baseline claim that religion is a dangerous presence in the
political process that should be constrained.
Limiting religion in the legislative process—and in politics more
generally—is typically justified on one of two grounds: first, that religious
participation undermines the liberty and equality of all citizens; and second,
that religious participation undermines the democratic process.
Turning first to the claim that religious arguments in the political process
harm the liberty and equality of all citizens, the claim is that religious
argument provides insufficient justification for government action in a diverse
and pluralistic nation.212 Religious argument in public debate, it is claimed,
urges improper grounds for government action. Proper grounds for government
action in a liberal democracy exist only when regulatory power is exercised “in
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.”213 In a modern secular state,
this reasoning necessarily excludes governmental action based on religion.
Legislation based on religion is “plausibly seen in some cases as forcing others
to observe a religious standard.”214 Coercion in the form of laws that adhere to
one religious perspective, then, denies equality and liberty to non-adherents of
that perspective.215

212 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 158; JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689),
reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION IN FOCUS 12, 17 (John Horton & Susan
Mendus eds., 1991); RAWLS, supra note 158; Audi, supra note 148; Audi, supra note 159; Rawls, supra note
158.
213 RAWLS, supra note 158, at 217; see also THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 155 (1991)
(“We must agree to refrain from limiting people’s liberty by state action in the name of values that are deeply
inadmissible in a certain way from their point of view.”); Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in
Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL
95, 100 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (positing a conception of justification reflected in an ideal political
procedure, under which reasonable citizens “aim to defend and criticize institutions and programs in terms of
considerations that others have reason to accept”); Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public
Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 742 (1993) (“[R]easons that rely directly on [religious] premises . . . will
be rejected by many as unreasonable justifications for political action.”).
214 AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 142, at 31.
215 See Audi, supra note 148, at 690; Audi, supra note 159, at 260–68.
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In addition, commentators who claim that religion must be excluded from
politics argue that religion undermines political debate.216 This claim stresses
the dangers inherent within religion. The argument is that while religion has
well-known social benefits, there is also a “dark side” of religion, one that is
“inherently intolerant and persecutory.”217 For these commentators, religious
argument has a peculiar capacity to inspire and foster intolerance of opposing
views.218 Politics, then, requires religion to be excluded in order to ensure that
political debate is not polarized and does not complicate efforts to react
consensus.219 Religion is, as one commentator notes, a “conversation-stopper”
that prevents the efforts to “keep a democratic political community going.”220
On this view, it is important to place special constraints on religion in the
legislative process because absent constraint, intolerant religious believers will
treat the legislative process as a battleground, rather than a forum for public
debate.221 In turn, politics will encourage dangerous divisiveness among
different religious groups, prompting hate, violence, and persecution.222 This
necessarily results in the undermining of the legislative process and, more
broadly, the stability of the liberal state. Commentators that take this position
argue that in light of the potential damage to democracy, religion is best
removed from politics, in order to “quiet religious fervor.”223 Only if religion is
removed from the legislative process will politics function appropriately.224
With these general concerns about the place of religion in politics in mind,
the next two sections turn to consider the effect that religious interest groups
have on the goals of—and relatedly, the concerns about—religious liberty and
democratic participation. These sections argue that the features of religious
interest groups—institutional mission, unclear representation, the nature of the

216 See AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 142, at 31 (claiming that a religious perspective that a
political opponent is somehow “deficient” can lead to intolerance); GREENAWALT, supra note 158, at 24
(discussing concerns of democratic instability as a justification for exclusion of religious perspectives);
Marshall, supra note 160, at 102.
217 Marshall, supra note 160, at 102.
218 See id.
219 See Magarian, supra note 150, at 129; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197–99 (1992) (construing the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses as establishing a
secular public moral order in order to sustain a religious truce).
220 RORTY, supra note 160, at 170–71 (claiming that translation of religious argument removes
democratically irrelevant rhetoric from political debate).
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 See Marshall, supra note 160, at 106.
224 See RORTY, supra note 160; Magarian, supra note 150, at 129–30.
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lobbying, and the opacity of the groups—combine to amplify the general
concerns about the effect of religion in politics. To this end, section B will
discuss the accountability limitations of religious interest groups, as well as the
potential for the capture of the legislative process by religious interest groups.
Section C considers the unique danger that religious interest groups pose for
religious liberty.
B. Religious Interest Groups and Costs to Democracy
As noted above, religious interest groups achieve unusual levels of
participation in the legislative process through their purported representation of
the religious view of a vast portion of Americans.225 This section argues that
the idea of “the religious viewpoint” is misleading, something that is obscured
in large part by the opacity of religious lobby groups. This section outlines
why it is that religious interest groups are imperfect representatives of the
religious American. It also specifies how the representation concern is difficult
to overcome as a result of the groups’ limited transparency and therefore
accountability to the principal the groups claim to represent, as well as the
political process more generally.
There are multiple reasons to think that religious interest groups fail to
represent “the religious viewpoint” in the political process. Core among these
reasons are four factors that can undercut the democratic gains made by
religious interest groups that were discussed in the above section. First, not all
religions engage a religious lobbyist to represent them in the legislative
process, and among those that do, member engagement is often limited.
Second, when lobbyists are engaged, positions are taken on issues despite a
lack of intra-religious agreement, or even consensus. Third, the delegation of
political representation of a religious viewpoint to lobbyists can result in a drift
from the original position of the principal. Fourth, the distinctive nature of
religious lobbying creates a risk of religious group capture of the legislative
process. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.
1. Political Disengagement
In the first instance, the democratic gains of religious interest groups are
undercut by the disengagement of the members that the group purports to
represent. Recall from Part I the two following features of religious interest

225

See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the participatory gains of religious interest groups).
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groups: that many religious interest groups do not represent a preponderance of
adherents of the represented religion and that it is often difficult to identify
which—or how many—members know or consider that the religious interest
group represents them.226 For these reasons, religious lobbyists are unlikely to
reflect the consensus of all adherents to the religious perspective being
promoted, and often not even a majority.
Even in those instances where individual members are aware of the
religious interest group purporting to represent their religious viewpoint in
politics, it is unlikely that the religious organization requires any member to
engage in policy decisions.227 The majority of the work religious interest
groups do in the political arena involves communications that are driven by
senior officials within the primary religious organization or collective that the
interest group purports to represent.228 Examples include letters to officials,
regulatory comments, input on proposed laws, and day-to-day communications
with members of Congress.229 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life
Report specifies that around nine out of ten religious interest groups contact
legislators either in person or in writing, using moral and theological
arguments in the communications.230 In addition, around seven out of ten
groups author policy papers,231 more than nine out of ten groups keep their
constituents informed,232 and a growing number hold “lobby days,” where a
specific religious interest group or coalition of groups bring members to
Washington, D.C. for a conference, providing training to participants and
organizing visits to congressional offices.233 In all of this, the voice of the
members is often irrelevant. Elliott Corbett, the former chief lobbyist for the
United Methodist Church, exemplifies the views of religious lobbyists asking
“What, in the meantime, would have happened to the prophetic voice of the
church?” if the church chose to solicit the views of its membership. He
explains, 234

226

See supra Part I.B.2–3; see also Seifter, supra note 20, at 1001–03..
See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–15; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 58–60; Bethany Albertson, John
Brehm & R. Michael Alvarez, Ambivalence as Internal Conflict, in AMBIVALENCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF
POLITICAL OPINION 15 (Stephen C. Craig & Michael D. Martinez eds., 2005).
228 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–15; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 58–60.
229 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 57.
230 Id.; see also HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 44–49.
231 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 57–58.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 58–59.
234 J. Elliott Corbett, Should the Church Lobby?, ENGAGE, Oct. 15, 1970, at 4, 8.
227
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Where deep moral issues are involved, the church cannot afford to
wait for most of its members to agree before it exercises
leadership. . . . [Church statements] should not be issued after the
Gallup poll has made it clear they are safe; they should be proclaimed
235
as a sort of “advance conscience” of the church.

In many ways, the disassociation of religious interest groups from their
member base is similar to what happens in mainstream lobby groups—and the
standard interest group account predicts that we should expect that members
will not in fact be engaged in the lobbyists’ decisions.236 However, in the
context of religious interest groups, the issue is not just that religious interest
groups allow for member disengagement. Instead, given that religious interest
groups are solicitous of the rights of religious Americans, and indeed reliant on
the large member base for political traction as well as political legitimacy, it is
important to recognize that religious interest groups are frequently disengaged
from their members.
The nature of this disengagement can differ depending on the nature of the
member base. For example, members of larger church groups represented by
the religious interest groups participate less frequently because the capacity for
involvement and input in the political process is low.237 Conversely, where a
religious lobbyist represents smaller religions or groups of individuals, there
might be a lack of resources to actively involve members in lobbying efforts.238
There might also be religious institutions and related lobbyists that, though
they have the resources to engage their members, lack any incentive to do so
for a variety of reasons.239
Ultimately, regardless of the nature of the member base, what is common
across all religious interest groups is that it is impossible to know, by looking
at a position advanced by a religious interest group, how many citizens
considered the issue. This member disengagement undermines the notion that
religious interest groups advance a “religious viewpoint.”

235

Id. at 6, 8. On the strategic choices of religious organizations, see generally FOWLER ET AL., supra note

55.
236

See Hall & Anderson, supra note 114; William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, Economic Models
of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
237 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 149–54.
238 Id.
239 Id.
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2. Intra-Religious Dissent
Second, even among those religious groups and lobbyists that have
consultative or collective decisionmaking processes, statements that a
particular religious interest group represents that religion’s viewpoint can
disguise internal dissent within the religious institution and among the
members.240 This point can be best illustrated with an example. The Leadership
Conference of Women Religious is a group established to represent nuns in the
United States.241 The group represents over 80% of America’s nuns.242 The
group has refused to publically take a hard line stance on abortion,
contraception, and ordination of women contrary to the desires of the Vatican’s
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.243 That is, a large portion of
American Catholics have refused to support a specific religious perspective.
The position of the Leadership Conference of Women is contrary to the views
espoused and promoted in the political arena by the leading Catholic lobby
group, the USCCB.244 The USCCB has consistently and continuously lobbied
for restrictions, for example, on a woman’s access to abortions and availability
of funding of contraceptives.245
The advancement of a religious viewpoint on issues that have deeply
divided members of a particular religious faith masks the variety of religious
views on a given issue.246 Yet, in many instances, there is no way to detect
these disagreements on matters of faith. Relatedly, given the opacity under
which these groups function, it is impossible to say with confidence how
240 PENNY EDGELL BECKER, CONGREGATIONS IN CONFLICT: CULTURAL MODELS OF LOCAL RELIGIOUS
LIFE (1999); Nancy L. Eiesland, Irreconcilable Differences: Conflict, Schism, and Religious Restructuring in a
United Methodist Church, in PENTECOSTAL CURRENTS IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 168 (Edith L.
Blumhofer, Russell P. Spittler & Grant A. Wacker eds., 1999); JAMES L. GUTH ET AL., THE BULLY PULPIT:
THE POLITICS OF PROTESTANT CLERGY (1997); see also Seifter, supra note 20, at 1003–07 (discussing similar
themes in a different context).
241 See About LCWR, LCWR, https://lcwr.org/about (last visited Mar. 5, 2015); Membership in LCWR,
LCWR, https://lcwr.org/about/membership (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
242 See About LCWR, supra note 241.
243 See, e.g., Mark I. Pinksy, American Nuns Respond to Vatican Rebuke with Conciliatory Statement,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2013, 9:03 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/20/catholic-nunsvatican-rebuke-us_n_3781683.html.
244 See CONGREGATIO PRO DOCTRINA FIDEI [VATICAN CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE
FAITH], DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT OF LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE OF WOMEN RELIGIOUS (2012), available at
http://www.usccb.org/upload/Doctrinal_Assessment_Leadership_Conference_Women_Religious.pdf.
245 For an overview of the USCCB’s position on abortion and contraceptives, see Abortion, U.S. CONF.
CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/abortion/ (last visited Mar. 5,
2015).
246 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–15; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 58–60.
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common these types of divisions are.247 However, intuition suggests that at
least in midsize to large religious organizations, where factionalism tends to
occur, some level of dissent is common.248 Particularly given the nature of
what is being discussed—matters of faith, conscience, and religion—it’s
difficult to imagine any religious interest group consistently speaking for all
members.
3. Policy and Positional Drift
The third reason that religious interest groups are imperfectly
representative of religious viewpoints is that the delegation of the political
representation of a religious viewpoint to lobbyists can lead to a drift from the
original position of the principal.249 The religious interest group’s staff
members are the people who are the voice of the religious principal before
Congress and other government officials. The interests of the lobbyist staff and
the members may diverge, and the frontline involvement of lobbyists creates
the risk of positional drift from the intended interests of the principal,
something that is common in any principal–agent relationship.
This problem of drift is particularly likely in the context of religious
interest groups. Political scientists have well-documented the extent to which
religious lobbyists ignore the views of their members and lobby in an
oligarchical manner.250 As a general matter, groups tend to be oligarchical out
of organizational necessity and the psychology of group leaders.251 This
matters because in the context of religious groups in particular, members join
for reasons other than political engagement—namely, religious reasons.252
Most people join church groups, for example, without thinking about the
church’s related interest group. Indeed, members are often indifferent to the
lobbying activities of the church leaders and even the fact that there is an
interest group representing the interests of the church in Washington, caring

247

See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the opacity of religious interest groups).
See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–15; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 58–60.
249 On the concept of policy drift, see especially Seifter, supra note 20, at 1007–09 (discussing policy drift
in the context of state interest groups in the administrative process).
250 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–16; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 150–52; Charles Kurzman,
Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A Comparative Analysis of Four Religious
Movements, 3 MOBILIZATION 23, 24–25 (1998). On the concept of oligarchy generally, see JEFFREY A.
WINTERS, OLIGARCHY (2011).
251 WINTERS, supra note 250, at 3–5.
252 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 60; see also HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–16.
248
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instead about the provision of the selective incentive—theology and faith.253
Because the lobbying of religious interest groups is a byproduct, the link
between the grassroots religious adherents and the leaders and lobbying staff is
severed. The result is an internal oligarchy that functions independent of
member decisionmaking.
A salient example evidencing oligarchy in religious interest groups is the
antiwar position taken by many religious lobbyists in the early days of the
Vietnam War, when the war was popular.254 Groups such as the National
Council of Churches, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and the
World Council of Churches all provided early antiwar statements and lobbied
Congress for American withdrawal from Vietnam. These lobbying efforts were
without member support, leading one commentator to conclude that religious
interest groups were “generals without armies.”255
In addition, the specific nature of religious lobbying tends to lead to
religious leaders justifying nondemocratic decisions in theological terms,
claiming that their job is to “discern God’s will” and not the interests of
members.256 A critical problem emerges when lobbyists and church leaders
guiding the actions of a religious interest group are faced with different
interpretations about the will of God. In these circumstances, while
occasionally the organizations might resort to member processes to resolve a
dispute, typically the views of church leaders are relied upon, even in the face
of member disagreement.257 This drift from the broader religious membership
significantly undermines the democratic gains of religious interest groups.
4. Legislative Capture
Finally, while interest-group lobbying always creates a risk of capturing the
legislative process—that is, having an “outsized influence” on the political

253 See Jon A. Shields, Between Passion and Deliberation: The Christian Right and Democratic Ideals,
122 POL. SCI. Q. 89, 97, 103 (2007).
254 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 152.
255 JAMES L. ADAMS, THE GROWING CHURCH LOBBY IN WASHINGTON 244 (1970).
256 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 60 (internal quotation mark omitted); see also FOSTER, supra note 26;
RICHARD J. GELM, POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY: AMERICAN CATHOLICS SINCE THE SECOND VATICAN
COUNCIL (1994); Paul A. Djupe, Laura R. Olson & Christopher P. Gilbert, Sources of Clergy Support for
Denominational Lobbying in Washington, 47 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 86 (2005).
257 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–16; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 61.
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process—religious interest groups create particular risks of capture.258 As
described in Part I, the nature of religious lobbying tends to differ from
standard mainstream lobbying in that the only acceptable policy outcome is the
ideal policy outcome.259 Recall that under a standard account of interest group
politics, interest groups form and generate pressure on the state.260 In turn, the
different interests pressure the state to find a compromise that is acceptable to
all groups—an acceptable policy outcome.261 This conception of interest group
politics does little to damage the democratic process—in fact, on the contrary,
it can be seen as democracy enforcing, where diverse interests debate
important issue in politics and come to a mutual agreement as to the remedy.
The peculiar nature of religious lobbying, where compromise on the ideal
policy position is an unacceptable outcome, means that while organized
religious interests might work to exert pressure in the classic pluralist sense,
their radical expectations change the nature of the legislative process.262 As
such, the legislative process is not a debate where parties sort through their
preferences to reach a consensus-based compromise.263 Rather, religious
interest groups tend to proceed on the premise that certain public policies are
fundamentally erroneous, and a compromise solution to those errors is
unacceptable. Because of this, the legislative process becomes a venue where
the strongest, most dominant interest seeks to exert control over the process for
the purpose of controlling the outcome.264
This refusal to compromise means that the policy process is not a reflection
of the balance of community interests. Instead, the process becomes
winner-take-all, where the ideas of bargaining and compromise have little, if
any, salience.265 The concern of capture of the legislative process on issues that
religious interest groups are involved, then, can be clearly seen when religious
interest groups lobby. The inability of religious interest groups to negotiate,
debate, and compromise on the outcome because of their religious mandate is
258 Seifter, supra note 20, at 1009–11; see also PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (providing a recent
contribution to the scholarly dialogue on capture).
259 See supra Part I.B.4.
260 See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
262 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 52–53; Lowi, supra note 114.
263 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 52–53; Lowi, supra note 114.
264 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 74–76. Hertzke cites an interview with Gretchen Eick of the United
Church of Christ, where she states “we are concerned about winning, not witnessing.” Id. at 75 (emphasis
omitted).
265 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 117–21.
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precisely the concern that animates commentators to push for exclusion of
religion in politics as a general matter.266 The goal of the democratic process is
that all citizens be able to discuss an issue in a way that is understandable and
debatable by all members of the political community.267 With their prophetic
mandate and vision, religious interest groups’ fundamental commitment to
their desired goal, combined with the powerful force of the large potential
voter base, undermines the democratic process.
The problem of capture is compounded by both the opacity of religious
interest groups and the subject of the lobbying—religion. While the opacity of
religious interest groups stymies any exploration of how religious interest
groups function in the political process, the fact that religious lobbyists are
representative of the religious voice in the political process necessarily
discourages skeptical analysis of the role and function of religious interest
groups in the political process. These features of religious interest groups
combine to create a situation of deep concern where the legislative process
itself is captured by religious interest groups.
C. Religious Interest Groups and Costs to Religious Liberty
In addition to democratic concerns raised by the presence of religious
interest groups in politics, there also exists potential for serious harm to
religious liberty. While Part II outlined the success of religious interest groups
in ensuring the religious liberty of its members to believe and act on their
faith,268 this section claims that any success of religious interest groups’
lobbying practices cuts against the religious liberty of the population more
generally. This section argues that rather than being an embodiment of
religious liberty, the inclusion of religious interest groups in the legislative
process results in very serious harm to the religious liberty of all Americans.
Focusing on harm to liberty caused by religious interest groups requires us
to rotate the flashlight ever so slightly from the process concerns outlined
above (i.e., the role of religion in political debate), to recognizing the impact of
religion on the outcomes of the debate (i.e., the resulting laws). The regulation
resulting from religious persuasion in the legislative process is infrequently
recognized by commentators. This is an error. As outlined in Part I, proponents
of religious speech in politics are not simply claiming a symbolic role for
266
267
268

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.B.
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religion, whereby the religious citizen is permitted to have a voice.269 Religious
speech is not passive; it does not merely provide a foil for the secular
perspective in political debate. Instead, in speaking from a religious
perspective, religious citizens—individuals or groups—seek to influence the
political outcomes.
For many religious citizens engaged in the political process, the goal is to
ensure religious liberty through accommodations from generally applicable
laws. For these citizens, religious liberty is satisfied by freedom from the state.
For others, however, religious liberty is only satisfied by ensuring the policies
of the state reflect their religious perspective in generally applicable law. That
is, in arguing for a particular policy, these citizens seek to entrench their
religious perspective as law.270 Recall the example of the Texas law severely
restricting access to abortions, overtly acknowledged to be a faith-driven
outcome.271 Those religious interest groups that lobbied for the restrictions on
a woman’s access to abortion were not simply interested in having a voice in
the debate. Their goal, like that of mainstream lobbyists, was to influence the
outcome.
In the traditional account of the legislative process, the law can be
understood as a system of impartial rules, serving as a framework within which
individuals and groups may pursue their own divergent and independently
defined conceptions of what constitutes the good life.272 Under this view, the
power of the law is in its hands-off approach to individual determinations of
morality and decisionmaking on difficult moral questions. What this simple
view of the law’s purpose misses, however, is precisely what religious interest
groups grasp: that the law is less hands-off in practice than in theory and has a
deeply constitutive role that can work to transform the boundaries of the state
in the image of a particular religious tradition. In other words, not only do
religious speakers want a voice in the political process, in many instances they
want to transform the law in their image.
What is wrong with well-mobilized religious interest groups shaping the
law and the boundaries of individual choice in our political community? After
all, mainstream interest groups arguably do precisely that when they lobby for
a legal or regulatory change that impinges on others’ daily choices. The answer
269
270
271
272

See supra Part I.B.4.
See Lowi, supra note 114.
See supra notes 207–11.
See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 160.
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lies again in the nature of the advocacy of religious interest groups. Recall the
goal of religious interest groups outlined above: religious interest groups seek
to change social policy to reflect a particular religious perspective.273 When we
focus on the lobbying outcomes—that is, what happens when the religious
lobbying is successful—we can see the burden that radical lobbying places on
non-adherents. Transformative law that enshrines a specific religious
perspective of the powerful and well-mobilized not only gives power to the
religious-group lobbying for the outcome, but importantly it isolates and
marginalizes the religious perspectives of the non-adherents by transforming
one specific religion into law. This is the essence of a burden on conscience.
Recall from Part II that proponents of religious argument in politics
typically claim that excluding religious citizens from the political process
would be a violation of the religious citizens’ religious liberty, therefore
inclusion is critical to religious liberty.274 Commentators argue that it would be
a violation of the very terms of equal citizenship that the democratic polity is
designed to guard to exclude religious Americans and, relatedly, religious
interest groups.275 The problem is that allowing these kinds of transformative
policies in the name of religious liberty—where the law enshrines a particular
religious perspective—necessarily violates the conscience and religious liberty
of the whole political community. Unlike religious advocacy for an
accommodation from a generally applicable law—for example, exempting
slaughterhouses, which operate according to the laws of kashrut, from
regulations—the consequence of transformative laws is that we are all bound
to adhere to them.276 Return again to the example of the Texas abortion bill,
passed in large part as a result of religious lobbying efforts.277 The stringent
abortion restrictions reflect a particular conservative religious perspective
about the origins of life that has its roots in a specific reading of the bible. This
religiously driven, religion-based law obliges all Texas citizens to comply with
a particular faith-based perspective, whether they adhere to that faith or not.

273

See Part I.B.4 (describing the distinctive lobbying style of religious interest groups).
See Part II.A (stating the goals of including religious views in politics).
275 McConnell, supra note 2, at 656; see also Jonah Perlin, Note, Religion as a Conversation Starter:
What Liberal Religious Political Advocates Add to the Debate About Religion’s Place in Legal and Political
Discourse, 100 GEO. L.J. 331, 340 (2011).
276 Although the focus of this Article is on lobbying that results in entrenchment of religious views in
generally applicable laws, there might also be concern that lobbying for accommodations from generally
applicable laws raises similar, although potentially less intense, concerns.
277 See supra notes 207–11.
274
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Thus, while the religious liberty of the specific citizen whose religious
liberty has been entrenched in the general law has been respected, the
conscience of those citizens that do not share the worldview of the well-funded
and politically mobilized religious group has been violated. The often radical
and transformative politics of religious interest groups results in a captured
state that, over time, becomes far from liberal, and instead is the very essence
of illiberality.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RELIGIOUS
INTEREST GROUPS IN FEDERAL POLITICS
As the previous Parts have attempted to demonstrate, once we attend to the
grassroots question of how religious voices participate in the political
process—through the medium of religious interest groups—the picture of
unmitigated benefits for religious liberty and the democratic process becomes
complicated. Accounting for religious interest groups, we can see that these
goals are, ironically, compromised due to the nature of the groups and their
manner of functioning. This means that some balancing is necessary, and some
tradeoffs may have to be made: if the best way of advancing religious liberty
and democratic participation in fact disserves religious liberty and democratic
participation, we must calibrate the role of religious interest groups in the
legislative process.
In order to more precisely identify the interests that must be balanced when
working toward the goal of ensuring religious liberty and democracy, it is
beneficial to recall the prowess of religious interest groups in advancing the
goals of religious liberty and democracy outlined in Part II.278 Recall that
religious interest groups institutionalize long-term commitments to advocate
for religious liberty and democratic participation.279 Religious interest groups
offer a focus on the religious interest (however defined in the terms of any
given faith), advancing that interest in the legislative process for the benefit of
the wide and often underrepresented member base. But these benefits come at
a cost: representation of a single religious view, defined by high-ranking
church members, can limit the information conveyed about the religious
perspective.280 And the insulation of religious lobbyists from the religious

278 See supra Part II (discussing the prowess of religious interest groups in advancing the goals of
religious liberty and democracy).
279 See supra Part II.B.
280 See supra Part III.B (discussing the costs of religious interest groups on democratic participation).

ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

12/17/2015 8:41 AM

LOBBYING IN THE SHADOWS

1095

adherents, as well as the general population, makes them opaque and
unaccountable in the political process.281
Yet, reforming the legislative process to account for the particular concerns
of religious interest groups could potentially impede the religious liberty and
democratic gains that religious interest groups have achieved. Consider what
would happen if reforms focused on protecting the religious liberty of the
non-adherents to the religious lobbyists’ agenda. A potent reform might
attempt to exclude religious interest groups from the legislative process as a
general matter, justifying it on the ground that the free exercise of a
non-adherent’s religion will always be violated by the presence of legislation
motivated by religious lobbying efforts. While this type of reform would
protect the non-adherents, it would potentially undermine the religious
freedom of the represented faith, and unfairly single out religion for
restrictions in the political process.282
With these tradeoffs in view, this Part proceeds to outline some possible
reforms that take account of the competing interests. As stated above, this
Article has proceeded on the assumption that the goals of religious liberty and
democratic participation have value.
The challenge therefore becomes finding a balance between the costs and
benefits of religious interest groups’ participation in the political process for
the goals of religious liberty and democratic participation—one that increases
transparency about, and accountability of, the groups’ advocacy platforms and
behaviors, yet militates against burdens on the religious liberty of
non-adherents, without disturbing the groups’ liberty and democratic gains.
What follows is a brief outline of possible directions for reform, all of which
require subsequent development and balancing against constitutional
considerations.
A. Religious Interest Groups and Their Members
The first possible locus for reform is the religious interest groups
themselves, or the religious traditions that they represent. With that said, it is
unlikely that either the religious institutions or their representative religious
281

See supra Part I.B.3.
See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm & Laurence H. Winer, Tax Law Bans on Political Campaign Speech by
Houses of Worship: Inappropriate Government Censorship and Intrusion on Religion, 2 J.L. RELIGION & ST.
101, 106 (2013). See generally NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT:
PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS (2011) (examining the role of religion in electoral politics).
282
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interest groups will be the primary driver behind reforms, as neither have any
incentive to deviate from the status quo.283
Yet, as the existence and role of religious interest groups are more readily
apparent—and the sometimes deleterious effects of religious lobbyists on the
goals of religious liberty and democratic participation become known—it is
plausible to think that the groups and their principals might advance changes
on their own accord. At a minimum, religious interest groups can disclose their
lobbying efforts, as well as the specific policies being lobbied for, to their
broader membership. This would go some way toward alleviating the
accountability concerns outlined in Part III above.284 Religious interest groups
could also go further, and voluntarily disseminate their membership and
funding information, along with their lobbying platforms and strategies, to the
general public via their websites.
This kind of voluntary disclosure is not unprecedented. Recall the
voluntary disclosure of lobbying spending and reporting of advocacy efforts by
the Friends Committee on National Legislation above in Part I.285 This
reporting also benefits the public at large and legislators by informing them of
the actions being taken in the name of any given religious institution or issues
group. In addition, this kind of voluntary reporting has the benefit of informing
the grassroots members of the actions that are being taken in their names,
possibly increasing member engagement and thereby increasing the
representativeness of the interest group, decreasing drift, and limiting the
potential of oligarchical lobbying.
B. Judicial Reform
There is a possibility that courts could play a role in mitigating any
deleterious effects on religious liberty and democratic participation of religious
interest groups via the Establishment Clause.286 That is, any individual or
group that feels aggrieved by legislation that is underscored by religious
doctrine could bring a claim that the legislation violated the Establishment
Clause. Thinking about the consequences of religious-interest-group lobbying
that are of most concern—where the religious interest group entrenches a

283

See supra Part I.B (discussing the features and structure of religious interest groups).
See supra Part III.
285 See Seifter, supra note 20, at 1022 (discussing voluntary disclosures in the states-as-lobbyists context);
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
286 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
284
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faith-based doctrine in the generally applicable law—there is at least a
plausible claim that the Establishment Clause will be responsive to this claim.
However, in light of the Court’s trajectory in Establishment Clause cases and
the narrow reading of the relevant constitutional standard, arguably the Court
is unlikely to employ the Establishment Clause to respond to claims of
religious entrenchment in general law.287
Under the Court’s current doctrine, litigants bringing a claim pursuant to
the Establishment Clause must claim either that the government is favoring one
religious sect over another,288 or that the government is benefiting one religion
by, for example, requiring or permitting prayer in public schools or permitting
religious symbols in the public square.289 In the case of entrenchment of
religious faith in generally applicable law, there is at least a colorable claim
that the government is benefiting one religion over another. As the Court held
in the leading case of Larson v. Valente, “The clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another.”290 Equally, there is a facial claim that these kinds of
laws benefit one religion, with its intangible, and often tangible, support for the
faith in question.
The problem, however, is that under either of these causes of action, the
Court will engage in a form of balancing analysis, and its jurisprudence
suggests that the balancing will favor the government. For instance, if the law
is held to prefer one religion over another, strict scrutiny will apply.291 In the
Religion Clause context, strict scrutiny has been referred to as “strict in theory
but feeble in fact,”292 with the Court frequently finding that the claimant’s
religion was not burdened, or that the government had demonstrated a

287 But see Gey, supra note 25 (arguing that limits on religious speech are consistent with current Speech
Clause doctrine).
288 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
289 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60–61 (1985) (affirming that a statute encouraging
mediation or voluntary prayer in school was unconstitutional); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116,
127 (1982) (affirming that a statute that vests in churches the authority to veto liquor licenses within 500 feet
of the church was unconstitutional).
290 Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.
291 Id. at 246.
292 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional
Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994) (“While in other constitutional
areas the compelling state interest test is fairly characterized as ‘strict in theory and fatal in fact,’ in the
religion cases the test is strict in theory but feeble in fact.” (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972)) (internal quotation marks partially omitted)).
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compelling (secular) interest for the law.293 Equally, under the Court’s
preferential treatment jurisprudence, where the Court has applied various tests
to assess the validity of the law,294 cutting against a judicial remedy is the fact
that the Court has tended to find that a facial secular motive is sufficient to
save the constitutionality of a law that might favor one particular religion.295
Relying on the judiciary as a deliberate choice for controlling religious interest
group behavior, then, is inadvisable.
C. Political Reform
The political branches of government are most likely to be the driver of any
reform given the likely incapacity of the courts—and the likely unwillingness
of the religious interest groups—to address the countervailing burdens imposed
by religious lobbying. Given that exclusion of religious interest groups from
the legislative process is both normatively and politically unpalatable, I suggest
here that there are two plausible options for politically driven institutional
constraints on religious lobbyists.
First, there is the possibility of more stringent policing of the limits on
lobbying permitted for organizations exempt under the Lobbying Disclosure
Act.296 Recall from Part I that pursuant to the LDA, churches and related
auxiliaries, associations of churches and their auxiliaries, or religious orders
that are exempt under the Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) from filing a
federal income tax return are exempt from the disclosure requirements of the

293 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (finding that there was
no burden on the Native American’s religion); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that the
government had demonstrated a compelling interest for the law burdening the Amish complainant’s religion).
294 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984) (outlining that the government must not
“endorse” religion, as assessed from the perspective of an objective observer); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612–13 (1971) (“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
governmental entanglement with religion.’” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citing
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968))). On Establishment Clause standards, see 2 KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008); DANIEL O.
CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES (2003).
295 See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“There is, of course, no more
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give
expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the
legislation.”).
296 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614 (2012); see Timothy W. Jenkins & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, Internal Revenue
Code Limitations on Lobbying by Tax-Exempt Organizations, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 107, at
393.
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LDA.297 Pursuant to § 501(c)(3), these exempt religious institutions are limited
in the amount of lobbying that they can do without jeopardizing their
tax-exempt status.298 Specifically, religious institutions will only maintain their
exempt status if “no substantial part of the activities [of the religious institution
include] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation.”299 Any institutions found to have engaged in prohibited lobbying
efforts will lose their tax-exempt status and, relatedly, their exempt status
under the LDA.300 One possibility for political reform, then, is heightened
policing of the lobbying efforts of religious institutions by the IRS.
This political reform is plausible, but has a number of potential flaws. First,
there are restraints on the IRS’s auditing of churches, the auspices of which the
related lobbying affiliates fall under for IRS purposes. Specifically, the Church
Audit Procedures Act, located in § 7611 of the Internal Revenue Code,
stipulates that only “an appropriate high-level Treasury official” can initiate an
investigation into a church’s tax compliance.301 A high-level tax official is
defined as “the Secretary of the Treasury or any delegate of the Secretary
whose rank is no lower than that of a principal Internal Revenue officer for an
internal revenue region.”302 Investigating churches, then, poses significant
administrative burdens on one government agency.
In addition, even if investigations are launched there still remains a discrete
problem that makes this reform suboptimal. Specifically for interest groups
representing religious denominations, many groups will not run afoul of the
Internal Revenue Code requirement that lobbying activities not comprise a
“substantial” portion of the denomination’s activities, even when they engage
in what appears to be significant lobbying efforts.303 While neither the Court

297 See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text (outlining the exemption under the LDA for religious
organizations).
298 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also Siri Mielke Buller, Lobbying and Political Restrictions on
§ 501(c)(3) Organizations: A Guide for Compliance in the Wake of Increased IRS Examination, 52 S.D. L.
REV. 136 (2007).
299 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Alternatively, § 501(h) includes a safe harbor provision, whereby an exempt
organization can opt out of the substantial amount test, and instead use an expenditure test to allow the
institution to make lobbying expenditures within a dollar or formula limit. Id. § 501(h).
300 Id. § 501(c)(3); Vladeck, supra note 109.
301 I.R.C. § 7611(a)(2) (defining the process for an IRA audit of churches and related organizations).
302 Id. § 7611(h)(7); see also Press Release, Secular Coalition for Am., Atheists Say IRS Not Doing
Enough to Hold Churches Accountable, (May 17, 2013), available at http://secular.org/news/atheists-say-irsnot-doing-enough-hold-churches-accountable.
303 Galle, Charities in Politics, supra note 66, at 1619–21; Galle, The LDS Church, supra note 66, at 371–
73.
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nor Congress has defined what constitutes “substantial” lobbying for any
organization, most tax lawyers assume that it refers to a portion of the
organization’s resources.304 The problem with this measure is that it fails to
capture the larger groups. Take, for example, the Mormon Church’s
multimillion dollar lobbying efforts in support of Proposition 8: observers
suggested that even the estimated $10 million in expenditures on lobbying was
a small fraction of the Church’s annual revenues and therefore were not
“substantial.”305 In other words, even if the IRS heightens their policing efforts
of the activities of religious institutions, the current regulations simply do not
reach so far as to capture all of the parties that we might be concerned about.
Second, there is the possibility of legislative amendment of the current
controls on lobbying disclosure requirements, specifically removing
exemptions for religious organizations from the Lobbying Disclosure Act.
Doing so would ensure greater transparency of religious interest groups and
accountability of those groups to both members and the public at large. To be
sure, the LDA is not a particularly robust tool for ensuring the accountability
of interest groups.306 Scholars have consistently argued that the LDA
requirements fail to capture important information of significant relevance to
public knowledge of the power of private interests in the political process.307
However, in the interests of neutrality and in light of general unwillingness to
single out religious interest groups for special exclusion from the legislative
process, removing the exemption would at least bring religious interest group
disclosures in line with all other lobbyists.
The most significant obstacle to the implementation of this reform is,
ironically, precisely the reason the reform is necessary in the first place: the
power of religious interest groups. As rational actors, legislators are
necessarily disincentivized from enacting these reforms.308 Legislators are
304

Supra note 303.
Janet I. Tu, Mormon Church’s Role in Prop. 8 Fight Debated, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at A12,
available at http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2008389449_churchpolitics14m.html.
306 See Hasen, supra note 107, at 202; Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian,
Interest-Group-Based, Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 520 (2007).
307 See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics and the Public’s Right to Know, 13 ELECTION L.J. 138, 150
(2014) (stating that private-private political interactions are not covered by the LDA); Youn, supra note 4, at
2110–11 (discussing the value of public knowledge of disclosures of individual contributions to political
campaigns).
308 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice in Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE:
A HANDBOOK 1 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). How effective legislators’ actions can be predicted and
incentivized is a subject of significant debate. Compare Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law,
305
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benefit maximizers, interested predominantly in their own political survival
(i.e., reelection).309 Legislative actions, then, are the result of a subtle and
complex process through which the gains derived from any legislative action
(votes gained) are weighed against the costs of the action (votes lost).310 When
we focus on religious interest groups, the possibility of reforming the LDA to
exclude religious interest groups seems tenuous. As noted in Part I, religious
interest groups have a strong presence and influence in Washington, in large
part because of the large member base that they can potentially call on to
respond to legislator action or inaction contrary to their beliefs on an issue.311
At least facially, it seems a challenging proposition to expect the legislature to
be responsive in the face of likely religious interest group opposition. Future
work should, however, continue to explore the role of the political branches of
government in constraining religious interest groups’ behavior.
CONCLUSION
While the advent of the new religious institutionalism has pushed questions
over the role of the appropriate relationship between religion and the state to
the foreground, commentators have thus far failed to address how the religion–
state relationship functions. This Article has sought to expose the overlooked
question of institutional design in the religion–state relationship. By
illuminating and analyzing the role of the prime instigator of religious
involvement in political life—religious interest groups—this Article reveals
that religious involvement in the political process is more complex than
previously thought. Religious interest groups are a structural presence in the
federal legislative process, and understanding their function and impact is
critical to any complete account of the role of religion in politics and public
life.
What this Article reveals is that while religious involvement in politics is
generally claimed to support core constitutional goals of democratic
participation and religious liberty, the features of these groups result in far
more complicated outcomes for these underlying values. While contemporary
popular and scholarly discourse generally praises the involvement of religion
1997 WIS. L. REV. 521 (arguing that predictive tools in social science can be useful in legal analysis and
predicting the decisions of public actors), with Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988) (arguing
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantitatively predict public persons behavior).
309 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 308; Robinson, supra note 13, at 150–51.
310 Robinson, supra note 13, at 150–51.
311 See supra Part I.B.2.

ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2

1102

12/17/2015 8:41 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1041

in the legislative process as serving the goals of religious liberty and
democratic participation, once we bring religious interest groups into view we
can see that the presence of religion in the legislative process can sometimes
compromise religious liberty and democracy. This Article argues that these
mixed results mean that rather than according unmitigated praise to religion in
public life, it is essential to rethink the role of religious interest groups in
politics in order to appropriately balance the competing outcomes for religious
liberty and democracy. By outlining some possible directions for reform that
attempt to account for these mixed results, this Article seeks to start a new
conversation about the institutional design of religious participation in the
legislative process. Ultimately, this Article concludes that, going forward,
discussions of religious involvement in political life should attempt to balance
both what is gained and lost though the entrenched presence of religious
interest groups in the legislative process.

